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I. INTRODUCTION
A. A Decade of Ferment, Ideology, and Conflict
There is a continuing revolution in American law schools that is trans-
forming legal scholarship, teaching, and the structure of the curriculum.
The revolution is altering the law schools' relationships with the legal
profession and judiciary. The revolution has not been contained within
the schools, in part because it is being stimulated by events and sources
outside the law schools with the schools being reactive rather than proac-
tive institutions.
One legal scholar has described what is occurring as a chaotic period
in which the post-World War II synthesis of Langdellianism and Legal
Realism has broken down.1 Law schools are not alone in experiencing
radical changes. Disciplines, institutions and social structures of all kinds
are experiencing fundamental reordering of their basic paradigms. It
* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State Uni-
versity. A.B., Muskingum College; J.D., Ohio State University; L.L.M., Harvard
University. The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Cleveland-
Marshall Fund of the Cleveland State University.
1 Cramton, What It's All About: Teaching and Scholarship, The President's
Address, AALS Newsletter 1 (Jan. 1985).
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would be surprising only if the law schools were not.2
The revolution in American law schools is being generated and sus-
tained by ten primary forces that are only loosely related. They include,
in no particular order of priority, (1) the continuing consequences of the
clinical, professional responsibility and humanistic educational move-
ments that started within the law schools during the late 1960s and 1970s;
(2) the methodological, political, intellectual and social effects of the Crit-
ical Legal Studies and the Law and Economics movements as well as the
Feminist, and Law and Literature efforts; (3) a rebirth of jurisprudence
and philosophy in the law schools, reflected not only in legal scholarship,
but in the content of various courses, including core curriculum offerings
such as Constitutional Law, Torts, Contracts, and Criminal Law; (4) rapid
changes in enrollment patterns and faculty hiring that have produced
far more diverse mixtures of law students and law faculty; (5) the Legal
Skills movement, including alternative dispute resolution, advocacy
teaching, interviewing, counseling, negotiation, and so forth; (6) the
changing nature of law practice and the legal profession, along with the
profession's increasing interest in the quality of legal education; (7) ju-
dicially driven demands that law schools produce more responsible and
competent lawyers; (8) undifferentiated dissatisfaction on the part of
many law faculty concerning the meaning, function, and quality of law
schools, law teaching, and legal scholarship; (9) a heightened desire on
the part of many legal scholars to use legal scholarship and/or practical
advocacy to help identify and/or resolve critical social issues; (10) the
natural cycle of knowledge systems in which, following a period of stag-
nation, there is a surge of intellectual energy and experimentation; (11)
the increased expectation that law faculty will engage in scholarly ac-
tivity throughout their academic careers; and (12) the dramatic changes
in student-faculty ratios that have occurred since the 1960's, fueled by
the rapid expansion in the number of law faculty positions.
Some legal scholars are greatly concerned about the consequences of
several aspects of the revolution. Francis Allen, for example, warns of
the dangers of a "new conceptualism. '3 Both Allen and Richard Posner
urge legal scholars not to wander far from their traditional ties to the
substantive interests of the judiciary and legal profession. 4 Other legal
scholars see the situation quite differently. Bruce Ackerman fears that
I The ferment in fields of knowledge has even made the New York Times. See
Campbell, Scholarly Disciplines: Breaking Out, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1986, at A18,
col. 1. John Naisbitt, author of MEGATRENDS, wrote in 70 A.B.A. J. 45 (June 1984)
that: '"There are cities, companies and institutions in this country that are like
dinosaurs waiting for the weather to change. The very ground is shifting beneath
us. What is called for is nothing less than all of us - including lawyers - to
reconceptualize our roles in a new society."
I Allen, Legal Scholarship: Present Status and Future Prospects, 33 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 403, 404 (1983). "In part, the problem is one of communication. Many in
the law schools are speaking a language incomprehensible to lawyers and judges."
Allen also suggests: "We feel less confident than we did formerly that we under-
stand our colleagues' judgments on questions of intellectual style, purpose, or
technique. We sense a dissolving accord on what is good scholarly work." Id.
4Id.; Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J 1113
(1981).
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the connection between the legal profession and the work of American
legal scholars may already be too close. He sees a risk that many scholars
might surrender their intellectual independence in exchange for economic
gain.5 The increasing connections between law faculty and law firms may
indicate that Ackerman's fears are becoming a reality. Similarly, the
rapid increase in continuing legal education courses and the potential
payoffs for law faculty could deflect faculty from true scholarship toward
doing work that would be of interest primarily to the CLE market. Critical
Legal Studies (CLS) scholars have accused more traditional legal scholars
of contributing to the legitimation of a corrupt legal system.6 Christopher
Stone evaluates legal scholars and finds them uncertain and afraid of
taking risks.7 Paul Carrington, on the other hand, looks at the CLS critics
of the existing core of American legal scholarship and indicts them as
dangerous nihilists.s Former Yale law professor and Haverford College
president Robert Stevens remarks, however, in reference to the tradi-
tional doctrinal scholarship that has been performed by legal scholars,
that while the "collection and regurgitation of doctrine might have
seemed scholarly to Langdell; it did not impress those in other disciplines
1 Ackerman, The Marketplace of Ideas, 90 YALE L.J. 1131 (1981). Much of
Ackerman's piece is a critique of Posner's article, supra note 4. Ackerman sug-
gests: "[The practitioner role may become so dominant that clients may pay
lawyer-professors to publish articles in law journals in the hope that a "scholarly"
article will seem more persuasive to courts than the same material submitted in
a brief." Id. at 1136.
The Critical Legal Studies movement (CLS) is an effort unified mainly by its
avowed "leftism" joined with a posture of attack (criticism) on what it conceives
to be mainstream legal scholarship and law. A justification of CLS can be found
in Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REv. 563 (1983). An
extensive listing of works considered products of CLS scholars appears in Kennedy
& Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461 (1984). See
also Kairys, Gabel, Tushnet & Holt, Perspectives on Critical Legal Studies, 52
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 239 (1985) (a series of four related articles centered on the
CLS theme); Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay
in Deconstruction, 36 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1984). A helpful analysis of Marxist
analysis and method is provided in MARxIsM: NOMOS XXVI (Pennock & Chap-
man eds. 1983). An interesting and not very favorable assessment of Critical
Legal Studies is by Menand, Radicalism For Yuppies, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 17,
1986, at 20. See also LORD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD & M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S
INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1985) particularly ch. 7, Sociological
Jurisprudence and the Sociology of Law, and ch. 11, Marxist Theories of Law and
State. CLS is discussed specifically in connection with "Legal Realism", id. at
709-16.
7 Stone, From a Language Perspective, 90 YALE L.J. 1149 (1981); but see Bar-
nett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence of Legal Philosophy, 97 HARV. L.
REv. 1223, 1234 (1984), who concludes that "contrary to the assertions of CLS
writers, there is less sense of 'crisis' in traditional legal scholarship today than
in recent memory. In fact there appears to be a rapidly growing mood of self-
confidence."
8 Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984). This article
should be read in conjunction with the exchanges of correspondence it generated.
The correspondence is contained in, Of Law and the River, and of Nihilism and
Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1985). Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstruc-
tion, S. CAL. L. REv. 1203, 1221 (1985) chastises the "nihilists" and, to a lesser
extent, Carrington for failing to use their talents wisely and for concentrating
on "tiresome epistemology."
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in the Twentieth Century. 9
The only undeniable fact amidst the revolutionary turmoil is that the
intellectual tapestry of legal scholarship, teaching and curriculum is
richer and more diverse than even a decade ago. The courses being taught
are more complex and diverse. Law is no longer so easily and rigidly
subdivided into "legal" and "social" or "moral" compartments, with only
the "legal" issues the subject of law courses and legal analysis. Legal
skills courses, as well as those focusing on the roles of lawyers and profes-
sional responsibility, have blossomed within the law curriculum. No
longer is the world of the lawyer being ignored by law schools. 10
American legal scholars are ranging far afield in the world of intellect,
hoping to uncover insights that might provide what Enlightenment phil-
osophes once thought was represented by human reason, "the little back-
stairs door that for any age serves as the secret entrance way to knowledge
.... "ll Some legal scholars are continuing in this spirit, seeking after
methods that might strip away our veils of ignorance and reveal some
form of true knowledge. For most American legal scholars raised in the
post-World War II synthesis of Langdellianism and Legal Realism de-
scribed by Cramton, this seeking after keys to wisdom and insight is a
new experience.
The revolution in academic thought was generated by a rising tide of
discontent with the quality of legal scholarship, as well as the increasing
orientation toward technical concerns of law practice. In 1978, John Ayer
described American legal scholarship as a "backwater of thought," out of
touch with ongoing developments in important fields of knowledge rel-
evant to law and legal thought. 12 Ayer's claim was at least partly justified
when made, although even by 1978, the seeds of the law schools' intel-
lectual revolution had already been planted and were growing rapidly.
The stage had been set for a revolutionary decade. 3
9R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s To
THE 1980s 76 (1983).
10 I have developed these points in Barnhizer, Prophets, Priests, and Power
Blockers: Three Fundamental Roles of Judges and Legal Scholars in America, 50
U. PITT. L. REV. 127 (1988) [hereinafter Prophets], and Barnhizer, The University
Ideal and the American Law School, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 109 (1989) [hereinafter
University Ideal].
I D. NOBLE, THE PARADOX OF PROGRESSIVE THOUGHT 7 (1958) (quoting C.
Becker in his analysis of the eighteenth century Enlightenment). Our modern
"problematique" is a loss of faith in any equivalent "secret entrance."
1 Ayer wrote in 1978 that,
Anglo-American law has let itself be shunted into a backwater of
human thought, where fresh tides of insight have passed it by. It
appears that we are trying to operate with outworn, or at least shop-
worn intellectual merchandise.
Ayer, Isn't There Enough Reality to Go Around? An Essay on the Unspoken
Promises of Our Law, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 475-76 (1978).
,3 A thorough overview of the various major approaches to analysis of law isprovided by LORD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD & M.D.A. FREEMAN, supra note 6. Of
particular interest to legal scholars are chapters 5. Natural Law, 6. Modern Trends
in Analytical and Normative Jurisprudence, 7. Sociological Jurisprudence and
the Sociology of Law, 8. American Realism, 10. Historical and Anthropological
Jurisprudence, 11. Marxist Theories of Law and State, and 12. The Judicial
Process.
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The revolution proceeded so rapidly that by 1985 the President of the
Association of American Law Schools concluded that we were witnessing
the end of the "dominant orthodoxy" of Langdellianism and Legal Re-
alism. He observed:
The synthesis of Langdell's method with legal realism that
produced the dominant orthodoxy of legal thought and legal
education for the post-World War II generation has finally bro-
ken down. Our world is more confused and unstable, but new
patterns of thought and action are emerging.' 4
The "new patterns of thought and action" are taking various forms. Some
have concentrated mainly on the processes of teaching, others on the
functions of lawyers and judges. Still others have sought to extend the
central knowledge core of law itself, considering that core to be connected
in some important way to the articulation of doctrinal principles by
judges.
Loose groupings of these compartments of experimentation include the
Law and Economics movement,'5 Law and Literature,' 6 Humanistic Legal
Studies,17 Critical Legal Studies,'8 clinical education, 19 research into the
sociology of law,20 historicism,21 considerations of professional role and
',Cramton, supra note 1.
'5The leading figure in the Law and Economics movement has been Richard
Posner. e.g., Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
925 (1979); Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U.CHI. L.
REV. 281 (1979). See also Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984); Easterbrook, Method, Result, and Authority:
A Reply, 98 HARV. L. REV. 622 (1985); but see Tribe, Constitutional Calculus:
Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592 (1985); Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1986); The Place of Economics
in Legal Education, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 183-368 (1983) (the entire section is devoted
to this topic).
I See, e.g., Symposium: Law and Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. (1982) (included
are articles by Levinson, Law as Literature, 373; Graff, Keep off the Grass, Drop
Dead, and Other Indeterminacies: A Response to Sanford Levinson, 405; White,
Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 415; Nelson, Standards
of Criticism, 447; Fish, Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision, 495; Hancher,
Dead Letters: Wills and Poems, 507; Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 527; Fish,
Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 551; White,
The Text, Interpretation, and Critical Standards, 569).
17 See, e.g., Himmelstein, Reassessing Law Schooling: An Inquiry into the Ap-
plication of Humanistic Educational Psychology to the Teaching of Law, 53 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 514 (1978). A central theme of modern humanism is the development of
a fulfilled human and identification of the qualities and understandings essential
to that mission. Two thinkers fundamental to humanism are Abraham Maslow
and Carl Rogers. See A. MASLOW, THE FARTHER REACHES OF HuMAN NATURE
(1971), and C. ROGERS, ON BECOMING A PERSON (1961).
18 See sources on Critical Legal Studies cited supra note 6 and infra note 91.
9 See, e.g., Barnhizer, The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its Theory and
Implementation, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 67 (1979); Pincus, The Clinical Component
in University Professional Education, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 283 (1971); Stone, Legal
Education on the Couch, 85 HARv. L. REV. 392 (1971).
1o See, e.g., THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (W. Evan ed. 1980); A. HuNT, THE SOCIO-
LOGICAL MOVEMENT IN LAW (1978).
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morality,22 a new devotion to jurisprudence including natural law, 23
professional technique, 24 political science and political economy, 25 lin-
guistic analysis, 26 Feminism, 27 structuralism, 2 and Constitutional inter-
21 Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981); Horwitz,
The Historical Contingency of the Role of History, 90 YALE L.J. 1057 (1981). For
more extensive inquiry into the methods of historical analysis, see R. MARTIN,
HISTORICAL EXPLANATION: RE-ENACTMENT AND PRACTICAL INFERENCE (1977); A.
SCHMIDT, HISTORY AND STRUCTURE: AN ESSAY ON HEGELIAN-MARXIST AND STRUC-
TURALIST THEORIES OF HISTORY (J. Herf trans. 1981); B. WILKENS, HAS HISTORY
ANY MEANING? A CRITIQUE OF POPPER'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (1978).22See, e.g., T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE
(1977); D. LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER (1983).
2 One of the best works to emerge within the last decade is J. FINNIS, NATURAL
LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980). See also R. DWORKIN, infra note 54; S. BUCH-
ANAN, REDISCOVERING NATURAL LAW (1962); LORD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD & M.D.A.
FREEMAN, supra note 6, at 92-245.
24An excellent source for references on legal technique is S. GOLDBERG, E.
GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985) (particularly "Collected Ref-
erences," 577-88). A careful examination of this work reveals how scholarship on
technical aspects of law practice and legal institutions can nonetheless generate
insights transcending the mundane and technical.2 5 R. FRANKLIN & S. RESNIK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RACISM (1973). See
also Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 379 (1988). There is no automatic consensus about the content and focus of
political economy. One view sees political economy as critique of orthodox eco-
nomics. Another emphasizes the function of political economy as helping to de-
velop alternative economic forms or improved methods of analysis. Insights into
these themes are offered in WHAT IS POLITICAL ECONOMY? EIGHT PERSPECTIVES
(D. Whynes ed. 1984). The perspectives discussed include the "Austrian," Insti-
tutionalist, Marxian, and Public Choice approaches. The themes include the for-
mal modelling of politico-economic relationships, examination of international
political economy, consideration of the role of concepts of property, and under-
standing the legal system as an important element of political economy.
26 Sources include, C. NoRIs, THE CONTEST OF FACULTIES: PHILOSOPHY AND
THEORY AFTER DECONSTRUCTION (1985); G. BECKER & P. HACKER, LANGUAGE,
SENSE AND NONSENSE: A CRITICAL INVESTIGATION INTO MODERN THEORIES OF LAN-
GUAGE (1984); W. CAIN, THE CRISIS IN CRITICISM: THEORY, LITERATURE, AND REFORM
IN ENGLISH STUDIES (1984); P. ROSENTHAL, WORDS AND VALUES (1984); E. SMITH
& D. MEDIN, CATEGORIES AND CONCEPTS (1981); PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF LAN-
GUAGE (P. N. Chase & L. J. Parrott eds. 1985); C. KATES, PRAGMATICS AND SE-
MANTICS: AN EMPIRICIST THEORY (1980); R. DAVIS & R. SCHLEIFER, RHETORIC AND
FORM: DECONSTRUCTION AT YALE (1985); R. SHILLER, NEW METHODS OF KNOWL-
EDGE AND VALUE (1966); THE UBIQUITY OF METAPHOR (W. Paprotte & R. Dirvin
eds. 1985); P. JULIA, EXPLANATORY MODELS IN LINGUISTICS (1983).
See, e.g., FRENCH FEMINIST THOUGHT (T. Moi ed. 1987); see also various
articles addressing the theme Women in Legal Education - Pedagogy, Law, Theory,
and Practice, 38 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 1-193 (1988). Another excellent source is C.
WEEDON, FEMINIST PRACTICE AND POST-STRUCTURALIST THEORY (1987). In a recent
study of 1,950 full-time United States law professors ranked as being senior law
faculty, Swygert and Gozansky found 1,872 (96%) men and 78 (4%) women. These
figures reflect the consequences of hiring and promotion decisions made prior to
1976. See Swygert & Gozansky, Senior Law Faculty Publication Study: Compar-
isons of Law School Productivity, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 373, 380-1 (1985). See also
Press, With Justice for Some, NEWSWEEK, June 4, 1984, at 85-86. Press offers
statistics and commentary reflecting that women lawyers are still denied equal
access to partnership positions in the more prestigious law firms.
1 A useful introduction for the legal scholar is Hermann, Phenomenology,
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pretation. 29 There are overlaps among several of these strategies, but
these various approaches often do not have much in common other than
that each is a response to what are considered needed reforms of the
traditional model of law school. Certainly they have not yet coalesced
into clear patterns capable of defining the new models of American legal
education and scholarship. They represent an extraordinary variety of
approaches, admirable in breadth, but spread so thinly as to potentially
overwhelm the quite finite intellectual, structural and economic resources
of law schools. The schools have yet to come to grips with how institutional
constraints determine, define and limit their capabilities and mission.
B. Loss of "Organic Unity"
As with any revolution, American law schools are filled with people
intent on arguing that their particular vision of knowledge, life, morality,
the legal profession, analytic method, or appropriate political community
is the only valid approach. We, therefore, see less intellectual debate than
conflict and unwillingness to be "tainted" by another's approach. Several
of these intellectual and/or pedagogical movements have generated hos-
tile camps based, at least in part, on self-interest, ideology and narrow
vision.3
There has been a loss of a sense of organic unity in the law schools
because a unified vision has been replaced by a much more fragmented
and complex collage of interests. The law schools' revolution is rooted in
Structuralism, Hermeneutics, and Legal Study: Applications of Contemporary
Continental Thought to Legal Phenomena, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 379 (1982). Two
very useful works possessing a style more directly transferable to the work of
legal scholars than many of the works of Continental theorists are D. LAYDER,
STRUCTURE, INTERACTION AND SOCIAL THEORY (1981) and G. ROSE, DIALECTIC OF
NIHILISM: POST-STRUCTURALISM AND LAW (1984). See also S. ROSEN, HERMENEUTICS
AS POLITICS (1987); J. FEKETE, THE STRUCTURAL ALLEGORY: RECONSTRUCTIVE EN-
COUNTERS WITH THE NEW FRENCH THOUGHT (1984).
See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); M. PERRY, MORALITY,
POLITICS, AND LAW (1988); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique
of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REV. 781 (1983); Brest, The
Fundamental Rights Controversey: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981); Cottrol, Static History and
Brittle Jurisprudence; Raoul Berger and the Problem of Constitutional Method-
ology, 26 B.C.L. REV. 353 (1985); Nichol, Giving Substance Its Due, 93 YALE L.J.
171 (1983).
30 See, e.g., Margolick, The Split at Harvard Law Goes Down to Its Foundation,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1985 at E7, col. 1; Margolick, A Professor at Harvard Law
Heads to West and to Right, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1985 at 58, col. 1, discussing
the "disastrous effect" of the Critical Legal Studies movement on the Harvard
Law School faculty. Paul Bator, a departing tenured faculty member, charged
that Critical Legal Studies has "politicized the Harvard faculty, lowered academic
standards, blocked faculty appointments, and discouraged qualified professors
elsewhere from going to Harvard - because, [Bator] said, 'serious and productive
non-left scholars do not want to be at an institution devoted to guerrilla warfare'."
Id.
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a heightened awareness that law is a powerful tool for shaping society.
Whether thought of as social engineering or instrumentalism, and re-
gardless as to whether the intent is to engineer a "liberal" or "conserv-
ative" society, the past twenty years have brought large scale changes
into the American law school. It took time for the changes to combine
into a critical mass, but they have done so and are now redefining the
law school. The concerns of women, civil rights, a rapidly expanded and
more diverse law professoriate, powerful and compelling social issues and
radical changes in society have altered the law, the legal profession and
the judiciary. These changes have transformed the texture of law schools
and legal scholarship. Francis Allen observes,
the sense of organic unity that has often characterized the law-
school world and provided for many of its greatest attractions
has become diluted; and the process seems likely to accelerate
in the future.3
There have been very few periods of intellectual inventiveness in the
American law schools. By and large, American law schools have been
musty, boring places bearing little resemblance to true centers of intel-
lectual activity. This is presumably why Thorstein Veblen concluded
American law schools did not belong in the university at all, and why
Robert Stevens reported that scholars in other disciplines considered legal
scholarship to be little more than regurgitation of doctrine.3 2
In spite of a tradition often characterized by mediocrity, the American
law schools have begun an intense, exciting, accelerated period of exper-
imentation. The greatest difficulty for the schools will be in sorting out
the truly insightful from the momentarily captivating. Given the limited
resources and diverse missions of the law schools, equally difficult is the
task of setting priorities. The law schools cannot do everything that ar-
guably ought to be done by an institution dedicated simultaneously to
the ideals of the university and obligated (or privileged) to educate those
21 Allen, supra note 3. There has been a rapid, revolutionary transformation
in the composition of the legal profession, judiciary, law student population and
law professoriate. By 1984 women made up 15 percent of the United Statesjudiciary, 38 percent of law students, and 16 percent of law professors. See Press,
supra note 27, at 85. In an extensive statistical tome, D. BOGUE, THE POPULATION
OF THE UNITES STATES: HISTORICAL TRENDS AND FUTURE PROJECTIONS (1985) re-
veals that as of 1980 there were 524,806 United States lawyers, including 27,576judges. Of that total 95.2 percent of the lawyers were white, as were 92.5 percent
of the judges. The ranks of law professors were 95.7 percent white. The makeup
of the categories by gender reveals women as 13.8 percent of law teachers, 13.6
percent of lawyers and 16.9 percent ofjudges. One of the most interesting statistics
is that by 1980, 43.3 percent of all lawyers were between 25-34 years of age,
reflecting the extremely rapid remaking of the legal profession over only one
decade. The effects of long-term male dominance of the legal profession show in
the disparate salaries received by male and female lawyers. In 1980 male lawyers
ranked fourth among all occupations in terms of highest mean income ($37,546).
Female lawyers, however, did not even appear in the top ten in terms of mean
income, although female judges ranked tenth ($16,565). Id. at 529.
32 R. STEVENS, supra note 9; T. VEBLEN, infra, note 100.
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who will become the leaders of American society.33 It is clear, however,
that American law schools will never again be as they were only a decade
ago. The orthodoxy of Langdellianism and Legal Realism has been broken
and will not be mended. The question that has not yet been answered is
the nature of the new patterns that are only now beginning to emerge.
II. THE ADVOCATIVE ESSENCE OF AMERICAN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
Understanding the continuing revolution in the law schools requires
awareness of the true nature of legal scholarship. Legal scholars, partic-
ularly in America, tend to have a different approach to knowledge than
academic counterparts in other disciplines. This is in part due to the
nature of the common law itself and to the system forged by Langdell
that elevated judicial doctrine into the center of the scholarly thought
done by law professors.34 This system created a relationship between the
work of American law faculty and the judiciary that generated a unique
and peculiar intellectual structure.
Some scholars search for abstract knowledge independent of any con-
nections with human societies or human interests other than simply the
basic human desire to know the deepest secrets of the universe. Mathe-
maticians and physicists most readily come to mind when we try to iden-
tify the seekers after "pure knowledge." Other scholars are less interested
in Grand Theories or unified structures of knowledge than they are in
the empirical study of infinitesimal units of data. Still others seek to
apply the methods of science to controllable compartments of social and/
or human phenomena. An increasing number of scholars are, however,
returning to the moral, political, philosophical and metaphysical tradi-
tions of inquiry that were shunted aside by the power of modern scien-
tism. 35
American legal scholars are different in that they not only seek knowl-
edge, but tend to be advocates. This orientation increasingly dominates
American legal scholarship. Given their training, experience, and the
materials with which they work, it is inevitable that legal scholars have
an advocative bent. Legal scholars study processes of conflict resolution
through advocacy. Judicial doctrines are temporary resolutions of con-
flicting positions presented by advocates. Even the classic justification of
- Robert Stevens suggests that the universities may have sought to educate
the legal profession because "[p]erhaps it gave them greater influence among that
powerful local elite - the lawyers." Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American
Law School, in 8 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 403, 415 (D. Fleming & B.
Bailyn eds. 1971). See also Madden's Foreword to R. NISBET, infra note 40, at vi.
, One scholar has commented, for example, that: "Ordinary language, in which
law is necessarily expressed (for how otherwise could its contact with real life be
maintained?) is not an instrument of mathematical precision but possesses what
has been happily described as an 'open texture'." LORD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD &
M.D.A. FREEMAN, supra note 6, at 1139. For an explanation of Langdell's reforms
at Harvard, see A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL: 1817-1917
29-37 (1918).
31 See discussion in Prophets, supra note 10, at 129-39.
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American law schools, that of teaching the skill of "thinking like a law-
yer", is inescapably a method of advocacy. This inculcates in law students
a method oriented to an advocative process, one linked intimately with
the basic fabric of advocacy.36 Law school teaching educates students in
the values, methods, and activities of the advocate. This occurs implicitly
in the first year and more explicitly as students progress through law
school.3 7 The mindset of legal scholars, lawyers, and judges inexorably
becomes that of the advocate. For the legal scholar, this mindset becomes
an integral part of scholarship; deceptive and powerful because its ad-
vocative nature is concealed, even from those who use it.
The simple fact that legal scholarship is advocative does not make it
illegitimate. The legitimacy of legal scholarship also depends upon a
broader understanding of the intellectual obligation of university schol-
ars.38 Hans Morgenthau has described the responsibility of the modern
intellectual as being a "prophetic confrontation with power."3 9 In a society
grounded on the Rule of Law, there is a heightened obligation for legal
scholars, acting as intellectuals of the law, to effectively confront insti-
tutions of power with challenges to wrongful use of their power. Legal
scholars are not alone in this mission but have a special responsibility
to confront unjust exercises of power because of their expertise and con-
nection with the wielders of legal power.
Confronting overt or covert abuses of power through legal scholarship
demands that the messages be delivered effectively. This generates the
36 See, e.g., Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. (1981); J.B.
CONANT, Two MODES OF THOUGHT (1964).37 See Stone, supra note 19; Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School
Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 247 (1978).
18 Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REv. 38 (1936):
With law as the only alternative to face as a means of solving the
myriad problems of the world ... the articulate among the clan of
lawyers might, in their writings, be more pointedly aware of those
problems, might recognize that the use of law to help toward their
solution is the only excuse for the law's existence, instead of blithely
continuing to make mountain after mountain out of tiresome technical
molehills.
Id. at 43.
1 Schlesinger, Intellectuals' Role: Truth to Power? Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1983,
at 28, col. 4. Schlesinger writes:
The contemporary intellectual, in his (Morgenthau's view) lived in a
world that was distinct from, though potentially involved with, that
of the politician. The intellectual .... seeks truth; the politician,
power. And the intellectual .... can deal with power in four ways:
by retreat into the ivory tower, which makes him irrelevant; by of-
fering expert advice, which makes him a servant; by absorption into
the machinery, which makes him an agent and apologist; or by "proph-
etic confrontation."
Of the four modes of response, the last seemed to him most faithful
to the intellectual's obligation. The "genuine intellectual," Hans Mor-
genthau wrote .... "must be the enemy of the people who tells the
world things it either does not want to hear or cannot understand."
The intellectual's duty is to look "at the political sphere from without,judging it by, and admonishing it in the name of, the standards of
truth accessible to him. He speaks, in the biblical phrase, truth to
power."
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tendency for many scholars, including American legal scholars, to at-
tempt to speak their truths in ways that ensure their messages are ef-
fectively communicated to those in power. Thus emerges the tendency to
use the weapons of advocacy or rhetoric in an effort to increase the impact
of the scholarship. This creates a dilemma and a danger.
Morgenthau's "prophetic confrontation" is a mission unshakably based
upon opposing power with truth, a mission to which the intellectual must
feel a commitment so deep it demands airing regardless of the conse-
quences.40 Advocacy, on the other hand, is a tool capable of being used
not only independently of truth but even in persuasive contradiction
thereof. The medium of advocacy, as rhetoric, carries within itself the
tendency to distort. Confusing the speaking of truth through "prophetic
confrontation with power" with the techniques of advocacy is one of the
constant threats American legal scholars must guard against if their work
is to be intellectually legitimate. The threat emerges from the basic na-
ture of advocacy, one expressed by Aristotle in his description of the
principles of rhetoric:
(1) You must render the audience well-disposed to yourself, and
ill-disposed to your opponent; (2) You must magnify and de-
preciate [make whatever favors your case seem more important
and whatever favors his case seem less];41
Similarly, as Plato observed,
rhetoric (is) ... a universal act of enchanting the mind by
arguments...
And:
[H]e who would be a skillful rhetorician has no need of truth
- for that in courts of law men literally care nothing about
truth, but only about conviction .... 42
, Ward Madden describes the "academic dogma" in a foreword to R. NISBET,
THE DEGRADATION OF THE ACADEMIC DOGMA (1971):
The heart of the academic dogma is the pursuit of knowledge FOR
ITS OWN SAKE. Knowledge and the processes of coming to know
are good in themselves, and the university, above all institutions is
- or used to be - devoted to them. To investigate, to find out, to
organize and contemplate knowledge, these are what the university
is all about. They constitute an ideal inherited from the Athenians,
but first institutionalized in the form of the university during the
Middle Ages.
41 TuE RHETORic OF ARIsTOrLE 3.19 (L. Cooper ed. & trans. 1932).
42 THE WORKS OF PLATO 292, 306 (I. Edman ed. 1928); Kronman, Legal Schol-
arship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955 (1981), suggests that our advocacy
oriented teaching of law students also influences our scholarly values. Kronman
asserts that "the most important skill the law teacher imparts is the skill of
advocacy ...." Id. at 959. Some pages later he concludes that the problem this
can create is that: 'The indifference to truth that all advocacy entails is likely,
it seems to me, to affect the character of one who practices the craft for a long
time and in a studied way." Id. at 964.
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1989
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
The inherent dilemma of the rhetorician/advocate is that, as a bundle
of techniques, written advocacy is the legal scholar's most important
method for marketing knowledge. The legal scholar's reliance on advocacy
reflects not only training and immersion in the advocative thought process
but recognition that even the most profound insight must capture the
attention of those toward whom it is directed. The desire to be heard and
accepted increases the risk that the scholar will fall prey to the trap of
subtly twisting one's work to gain attention. The dilemma becomes even
more intense when it is understood that acceptance of one's scholarship
often depends upon the degree to which it advances the "party line" of a
particular orthodoxy, intellectual or political movement. Self-questioning
truths, and legitimate insights contained within an "opponent's" work or
an opposing school of thought, cannot be acknowledged for fear of lending
credence to their arguments. These tendencies to distort, ignore, over-
state, and attack may be increasing as consequences of our information
explosion, a condition that makes it increasingly more difficult to be
heard .4
3
Advocacy is inherently dialectical, creating an opposition of terms and
beliefs.44 By itself such intellectual opposition is not bad. Much intellec-
tual progress has been generated through the opposition of competing
intellectual arguments. 45 At least at the abstract level, however,
syntheses that result from the interaction of antithetical premises, that
have themselves been distorted, cannot produce anything "true.."46 This
premise has led some scholars to attempt to reject the dialectical process
as a source of true knowledge and to seek to create a new methodological
beginning.47 The irony is that such efforts have simply injected new an-
titheses into the equation.
41 J. MARTIN, THE WIRED SOCIETY (1978) describes a "knowledge explosion,"
whereby in the year 1800 there were only 100 scientific journals, 1000 by 1850,
10,000 in 1900, and 100,000 as of 1950. Id. at 116. Humans must cut their field
of study into increasingly finer pieces to keep up with even an infinitesimal bit
of the available knowledge. J. ELLUL concludes in THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY
132 (1967) that.
Everyone today has his own professional jargon, modes of thought,
and peculiar perception of the world .... The man of today is no longer
able to understand his neighbor because his profession is his whole
life and the technical specialization of this life has bound him to live
in a closed universe.
See generally J. RUSSELL, ANALYSIS AND DIALECTIC: STUDIES IN THE LOGIC OF
FOUNDATION PROBLEMS (1984). See also J. TAMINIEUS, DIALECTIC AND DIFFERENCE:
FINITUDE IN MODERN THOUGHT (1985).
45See, G. ROSE, supra note 28.
4 This of course depends on how we intend the idea of "true." If we define truth
only in terms of a single, ultimate unvarying measure for any proposition then
there is little, even in science, that has been proved true. The ideas of uncertainty,
randomness, and relativity that have come to dominate our intellectual structure
have produced a significant degree of uncertainty regarding claims to truth. The
dimension of law possesses even higher levels of uncertainty given the complexity
and subtlety of its subject matter.
47 G. RosE, supra note 28.
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In any event, given the distorting effects of rhetoric, achieving balance
between truth and persuasive impact is difficult. The probability of subtle
distortions by legal scholars is even higher because legal scholars have
not understood the methods they use. Being barely aware of the nature
and power of their methods, legal scholars are more likely to be captured
by subjective value systems contained in those methods, in their data,
and in their primary reference institutions, i.e., lawyers, the judiciary,
and other legal scholars. The risk of distortion is further increased due
to the "soft" nature of our knowledge about law and legal methods.4
III. THE CONTEST TO CREATE THE "RULING IDEAS"
It is increasingly difficult for American legal scholars to retain their
intellectual balance because the warring schools of thought within the
law schools have organized into political interest groups. Many of the
new scholars are no longer simply individual scholars intent on learning
and wisdom. They have become organized groups of true believers intent
on turning knowledge into weapons to be used against their "enemies.."
49
Many have apparently come to accept Keynes's observation about the
transcendent power of ideas, right or wrong, voiced in his concluding
notes to the General Theory.50
[Tihe ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when
they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful
than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by
48 Legal knowledge is "soft" and in our implicit recognition of this fact in a
scientific world, we have been afraid to make fools of ourselves because we doubt
the relevance, truth, or validity of what we have to say. Felix Cohen, for example,
describes the European jurist Von Jhering as once dreaming he had died, finding
himself in a "special heaven reserved for the theoreticians of the law" with all
legal concepts in their purest or most true form. So that his mind would no longer
be cluttered and encumbered with earthly knowledge Von Jhering, as were all
new entrants, was required to drink the "draught of forgetfulness." Embarrass-
ingly, the draught proved superfluous for jurists. It turned out "[t]hey had nothing
to forget." Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 25
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935). Edward Levi describes the "soft" nature and dynamics
of legal thought as follows:
[T]he kind of reasoning involved in the legal process is one in which
the classification changes as the classification is made. The rules
change as the rules are applied. More important the rules arise out
of a process which, while comparing fact situations, creates the rules
and then applies them .... Not only do new situations arise, but in
addition peoples' wants change. The categories used in the legal proc-
ess must be left ambiguous in order to permit the infusion of new
ideas.
E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 3, 4 (1949).
49 See, E. HOFFER, THE TRUE BELIEVER: THOUGHTS ON THE NATURE OF MASS
MOVEMENTS (1951). Hoffer comments on the function of the "man of words" in
the success of a movement, as follows: "[I]mperceptibly the man of words under-
mines established institutions, discredits those in power, weakens prevailing be-
liefs and loyalties . ..." Id. at 120.
50 J.M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY
383 (1935).
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1989
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite
exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves
of some defunct economist .... [T]he power of vested interests
is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment
of ideas. .. [S]oon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which
are dangerous for good or evil.51
Many legal scholars have succumbed to the opportunity to be among
those whose ideas provide the foundation principles for those in power.
Scholars enjoying the trappings of power can easily be seduced into being,
as Morgenthau described, "agents and apologists" using their intellects
to preserve and protect rather than challenge the exercise of power.52 In
such a process truth becomes less important than acceptance and contin-
uance. 53
Most legal scholars are, however, not agents, apologists or servants of
power, but principled rhetoricians attempting to make important contri-
butions to the quality of modern society. Just as were Hobbes, Locke,
Pufendorf, Burke, Rawls, and others, the best of the scholars are political
composers writing sonatas with ideas of the law and political belief sys-
tems serving as notes, rhyme, melody, and meter. Ronald Dworkin is
concerned with saving modern liberalism, and asserts principles involv-
ing "rights" and a somewhat mystical description of how judges decide
"hard" cases, i.e., cases for which there is no clear precedent. 54 Robert
Nozick, as classic liberal, 55 fits comfortably within the framework of the
,1 Id. at 383-84. (Emphasis added).
51 Schlesinger, supra note 39.
51 E. HOFFER, supra note 49, claims, for example, that "[t]here is a moment in
the career of almost every fault-finding man of words when a deferential or
conciliatory gesture from those in power may win him over to their side. At a
certain stage, most men of words are ready to become timeservers and courtiers."
Id. at 121-22. Jacques Ellul similarly suggests that given the increasing technical
orientation of our educational system, the "intelligentsia will no longer be a model,
a conscience, or an animating intellectual spirit for the group .... They will be
the servants, the most conformist imaginable, of the instruments of technique."
J. ELLUL, supra note 43, at 349.
R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). See also RONALD DWORKIN
AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE (M. Cohen ed. 1984). A "Selected Bibliog-
raphy on Ronald Dworkin" appears following p. 300. Included are essays by Joseph
Raz, H.L.A. Hart, Kent Greenwalt, Michael Sandel and Richard Posner. An ex-
tensive reply by Dworkin appears at pp. 247-300.
-See generally R. NoZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). For classical
liberal, I adopt Overton H. Taylor's distinction between the modern liberal, com-
mitted to "humanitarian big government of the welfare state," and the "19th
century liberal attitude." This is described in 0. TAYLOR, THE CLASSICAL LIBER-
ALISM, MARXISM, AND THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 7 (1962).
In fact, and in spite of the fact that the views and attitudes of our
remaining devotees of that older tradition are now generally described
- correctly enough in one sense - as conservative or even reaction-
ary, the old liberal ideal was a society of largely free or ungoverned
or only self-governed, independent individuals, living together under
and jointly supporting a small, simple, inexpensive government hav-
ing only a quite limited sphere of authority or a few quite limited
powers and functions.
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American Neoconservative movement. 56 Nozick advocates principles re-
flecting a Hobbesian sort of human nature, free will, private property and
the "minimal state. 5 7 While, as with any of the guiding principles, not
one of Nozick's assertions has ever been proved "true," they are extremely
powerful hypotheses, acceptance of which generates and determines dis-
tinct legal, economic, and political systems. Richard Posner offers a sort
of semi-modern variant of conservative laissez-faire economic ideology
relying heavily on the metaprinciple of "efficiency."58 John Finnis seeks
to uncover a coherent moral basis for law.59 Roberto Unger, Duncan Ken-
nedy, and others involved in the Critical Legal Studies movement assert
a core of Marxist principles.60 These advocates of ideas fit into another of
Keynes's insights, that of the gradual, rather than immediate, capturing
of the field by the power of ideas.
[Fior in the field of economic and political philosophy there are
not many who are influenced by new theories after they are
twenty-five or thirty years of age, so that the ideas which civil
servants and politicians and even agitators apply to current
events are not likely to be the newest.61
Dworkin, Nozick, Posner, Finnis, and the Critical Legal Studies "left-
ists" are all political scholars. The "legitimists" such as Dworkin, Finnis,
Posner, and Rawls are, however, fighting on the real battlefield within
which key institutions make policy, impose penalties, and allocate power.
The "radical" Critical Legal Studies, as a political movement, at times
seems engaged in a self-absorbed campaign waged on an illusory land-
scape. This is because American decision-makers, including the judiciary,
6 p. STEINFELS, THE NEOCONSERVATIVES (1979) provides a critical assessment
of the Neoconservative movement. For a considerably more favorable description
by one of Neoconservatism's leading figures, see I. KRISTOL, REFLECTIONS OF A
NEOCONSERVATIVE (1983). Kristol states:
Neoconservatism is a syncretistic intellectual movement. But it aims
at more than syncretism; it seeks a new synthesis .... In economic
and social policy, it feels no lingering hostility to the welfare state,
nor does it accept it resignedly, as a necessary evil. Instead it seeks
not to dismantle the welfare state in the name of free-market eco-
nomics but rather to reshape it so as to attach to it the conservative
predispositions of the people.
Id. at 99.
17 See NOZICK, supra note 55, at ix.
Our main conclusions about the State are that a minimal state, limited
to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, en-
forcement of contracts, and so on, is justified; that any more extensive
state will violate person's rights not to be forced to do certain things,
and is unjustified .... (ix).
5 R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE
(1981).
49 J. FINNIS, supra note 23.
60 See CLS sources, supra note 6; infra note 91.
61 J.M. KEYNES, supra note 50, at 383-84.
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are neither Marxists nor socialists. Any substantive system that purports
to take its principles from an idea structure that has been explicitly
rejected by nearly all generations of Americans, represents an error in
judgment at least from the perspective of being able to achieve political
impact. Keynes's observation helps us to understand why Posner, Rawls,
Finnis, and Dworkin have had significantly greater impact than Unger
and Kennedy. The difference is not a function of the scholars' intellectual
substance, but the extent to which the ideas being advocated fit into idea
systems already held, whether true or false, good or bad.62 Recognition
of this may explain why Duncan Kennedy has recently sought to recast
Critical Legal Studies as continuing the tradition of Legal Realism.6 3
Dworkin, Posner, Finnis, Kennedy, and Unger rank among our modern-
day prophets of legal scholarship. In the case of CLS, however, there has
been a failure to recognize that prophets derive their power from au-
thoritative sources contained within their tradition and culture, not from
external dogma.6 This realization is why the Chicagoans have reached
back into the nineteenth century to ground their system on the cultural
myths of laissez-faire capitalism. Whatever the realities of nineteenth
century American economic beliefs and behaviors, as cultural myth, they
comprise a deep-rooted system upon which a superstructure can be built.65
This is what the Neoconservatives have done, a strategy applied equally
to Constitutional analysis and interpretation anchored to such myths as
the "intent of the framers." Dworkin and Finnis have similarly anchored
their arguments in traditional value systems that are integral, though
implicit, parts of Western culture.6
Very little of the political content of Critical Legal Studies, on the other
hand, is anchored to American cultural myths.6 7 CLS, therefore, rests on
62 Consider, for example, Ausubel, Cognitive Structure and the Facilitation of
Meaningful Verbal Learning, 14 J. TEACHER EDUC. 217 (1963): "[Eixisting, cog-
nitive structure ... an individual's organization, stability and clarity of knowl-
edge in a particular subject matter field. . . is the principal factor influencing the
learning and retention of meaningful new material."
See Occasional Paper No. 1, A Discussion on Critical Legal Studies at the
Harvard Law School, Harvard Society for Law and Public Policy and the Fed-
eralist Society, May 13, 1985, at 9.
1 Prophets, supra note 10, at 190-94.
See generally, D. BOORSTIN, THE DECLINE OF RADICALISM 71-96 (1963), chap-
ter IV, The Perils of Indwelling Law.
6See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 54; J. FINNIS, supra
note 23.
11 See, e.g., Unger, supra note 6; R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVE-
MENT (1986). In the book, Unger explains and defends CLS reliance on leftist
theoretical traditions such as Marxism and structuralism as follows:
[CLS'] starting points of social theory may seem on our part an act of
intellectual self-destruction. After all, the major theoretical traditions
that have served the left until now, such as Marxism and structur-
alism, have leaned heavily on the idea of a metaorder in either its
compulsive-sequence or its possible-worlds variant. Nevertheless, this
apparent intellectual suicide allows the basic intention and method
of critical social thought to triumph over ideas that only imperfectly
apply the method and express the intention.
Id. at 108. See also G. ROSE, supra note 28.
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an extremely soft political foundation and cannot reach the deep belief
structures of Americans, including the judiciary. Even in making these
comments concerning Critical Legal Studies, it is important to admit that
CLS may ultimately prove to have made a greater contribution to the
growth of intellectual quality in the law schools than will Law and Eco-
nomics. The CLS arguments and methods will, however, be transformed
as they pass through the medium of American legal scholarship, enriching
that scholarship but losing their radical political content in the process.68
Law and Economics has been effective in the short term because of the
apparent precision and power of economic method, but it may have less
to offer over time.
Formal economic methods will prove unproductive in the context of
most law cases. Conversely, the methodologies and conceptual languages
provided by many CLS scholars offer languages of discourse that will
prove far more rich, complex, insightful, and extensive than the technical
language of formal economic method. This may be because the law is not
a subject that lends itself to precise inquiry of the type represented by
economics, except in very isolated units and small doses. Similarly, within
the law, the utility of formal economic analysis is much more rapidly
exhausted than that of the other methods of insight. Having, for example,
identified and controlled the economic component as one relevant element
of a legal decision, where does one go? Formal economic method can be
a powerful and useful tool, but it cannot answer the complex issues re-
flected in many of the most vital areas of the law.69 When, however, the
orientation to economics is understood as political economy, reflective of
normative, structural, moral, and distributive judgments, then economic
thought and principles will be understood as tools of significant use in
clarifying the choices made by legal institutions. In this form, political
economic analysis has already enriched American legal scholarship and
teaching. We are only at the beginning of its potential.
IV. NEW LANGUAGES OF DISCOURSE
The changes within the law schools are generating new languages of
discourse. Arthur Koestler has described how ideas and knowledge pass
through definite cycles:
The new territory opened up by the impetuousness of a few
geniuses, acting as a spearhead, is subsequently occupied by
the solid phalanxes of mediocrity; and soon the revolution turns
into a new orthodoxy ... and ultimately, estrangement from
Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38
(1985), captures the essence of how legal thought seizes on the insights of other
disciplines and converts them to terms relevant to the law. "Law," Elliott claims,
"is a scavenger. It grows by feeding on ideas from outside, not by inventing new
ones of its own." Id. at 38.
61 See Tribe, supra note 15; Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. oF LEGAL STUD.
191 (1980).
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reality.... The emergent orthodoxy hardens into a "closed sys-
tem" of thought, unwilling or unable to assimilate a new em-
pirical data or to adjust itself to significant changes in other
fields of knowledge; sooner or later the matrix is blocked, a
new crisis arises, leading to a new synthesis, and the cycle
starts again.
70
Koestler's cycle reflects excitement, genius, insight, experiment, re-
finement, and then a period of settling and consolidation as insight be-
comes accepted. Acceptance then becomes dogma and orthodoxy. For a
time, the orthodoxy is sufficiently powerful to be able to ignore or suppress
new insights. The excessive dominance of the orthodoxy ultimately, how-
ever, generates its own counterrevolution, just as has occurred in the law
schools.
Familiar and accessible databases and the methods in which one has
been trained play important parts in defining a controlling orthodoxy.
Methods and databases create frameworks that establish boundaries and
define structures of basic knowledge into which a particular field's schol-
ars inquire and into which they, at any particular time, possess the ability
to proceed.7' Ideas, details, and methodologies outside the framework have
a difficult time penetrating the intellectual membranes sealing off each
disciplinary universe. 2 Charles Axelrod describes what happens in his
Studies in Intellectual Breakthrough,7 3 identifying how ideas "ossify" and
how "new languages of discourse" emerge to challenge the existing sys-
tem:
Ideas do not float freely among people; they become rooted in
commitments, ossified and sustained within intellectual com-
munities; they are cradled among avid sponsors and defenders
whose work relies on their stability. Thus the tension of dis-
course refers not merely to the presence of one language ad-
dressing (and straining) another, but to the presence of one
language addressing the inertia of another.7 4
70 A. KOESTLER, THE ACT OF CREATION 255-56 (1964). Alfred Z. Reed described
such a cycle occurring during the twenty-five year period following the Civil War
as a vital one for law schools: A.Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION
OF THE LAW 273 (1921).
In spite of the blind formalism and inglorious compromises (prior
to that period] the first quarter century after the Civil War was a
period of vital growth for law schools. It contrasted sharply both with
the preceding and with the following generation. The technical
changes ... sprang from a general desire, on the part of both prac-
titioners and schoolmen, to make legal education better than it had
been before ....
71 . COHEN, REVOLUTION IN SCIENCE 467-68 (1985) observes:
Max Planck ... is often quoted to the effect that "new scientific truth
does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see
the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new
generation grows up that is familiar with it."
72 Id.; see also A WOLF, infra note 89, at 54.
73 C. AXELROD, STUDIES IN INTELLECTUAL BREAKTHROUGH, FREUD, SIMMEL,
BUBER (1979). I. COHEN, supra note 70, at 468, describes "the shift of allegiance
from one paradigm to another as an act similar to religious conversion."
74 C AXELROD, supra note 73, at 2-3 (emphasis added).
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Like Koestler, Axelrod describes a cycle within which the creative in-
sight eventually crystallizes into a barrier against creativity. While this
might seem a negative phenomenon, it is a critical element in stimulating
the new bursts of creativity.75 Stagnant systems of thought draw challenge
to themselves. By their existence and unwillingness to accept change,
they generate the pressures that lead to their own weakening. Ultimately,
the pressures must be released through new creative bursts.
Scholars in any discipline eventually exhaust the language of their
paradigm. They have said all they can reasonably say with the language
of what has become a closed system of discourse. Their discourse becomes
sterile unless new language is infused into the discipline, or new content
given the existing language. The law schools have been experiencing just
such a process as is described by Axelrod. New languages are addressing
the inertia of the preexisting mode of discourse. That older mode of dis-
course is reflected in what Cramton referred to as the synthesis of Lang-
dellianism and Legal Realism. The malaise in legal scholarship identified
by Christopher Stone and John Ayer was due partly to the exhaustion of
the power of the language being used by legal scholars, not only in their
writing but in their teaching and definition of mission as well.7 6
The "myth of science" that underlay Langdellianism and Legal Realism
is dead although even now its ghost dominates the perception of the
mission of legal scholarship.7 7 Confronted by a rigid orthodoxy, many
American legal scholars have been seeking to generate new languages
of discourse. There will always be efforts to define law and legal schol-
arship as scientific, but the Langdellian illusion of law as science and/or
pure rationality has been shattered. This does not mean that science is
irrelevant to either law or legal scholarship, but it does mean that it is
entirely inadequate as an explanatory vehicle or method for most, if not
all of the important questions with which law must deal.7 8
11 In his REFLECTIONS ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (Harvard Classics ed., C.
Eliot, ed., vol. 24, 1909) Edmund Burke observes,
Difficulty is a severe instructor, set over us by the supreme ordinance
of a parental Guardian and Legislator, who knows us better than we
know ourselves, as he loves us better too .... He that wrestles with
us strengthens our nerves, and sharpens our skill. Our antagonist is
our helper.
Id. at 315.
76 See Stone, supra note 7, and Ayer, supra note 12.
11 J. B. Conant comments on Langdell as follows:
Law, considered as a science, wrote Langdell. What did he have in
mind when he wrote that word "science"? Not the kind of activity in
which at that time Clark Maxwell was engaged; not the development
of the atomic-molecular theory .... Langdell was thinking of science
much as was Bell or Edison .... To me, therefore, Langdell is to be
placed among the great American inventors of the nineteenth century.
J.B. CONANT, supra note 36, at 45.
1 See, e.g., J. COLLINS, CROSSROADS IN PHILOSOPHY-EXISTENTIALISM, NATURAL-
ISM, THEISTIC REALISM 33 (1969). Collins expressed the opinion that:
There are two false routes by which the human mind seeks to fulfill
the need for a deeper grasp on being. One is the way of scientism,
which refuses to recognize the essential boundaries of scientific
thought. The other is an undisciplined appeal to sheer feeling and
purported irrational sources of insight.
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1989
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
With the myth of science shattered, alternative intellectual paradigms'
of political, philosophical, humanistic, and metaphysical natures have
flooded into the vacuum.79 This is why the sense of "organic unity" in the
law schools has broken down. Rather than a linear sense of shared sci-
entific or rational progress, we now experience idiosyncratic fragments
of challenge to mainstream articulation of primary interests. This is why
we are uncertain of the quality, content, and standards for judging much
of the alternative scholarship that has emerged s° It is why many are
vying for the power to define the emerging models of law school. It is why
many others are resisting the rampant experimentation they perceive to
be threatening the integrity of the existing model of legal education and
scholarship.
One problem with the law schools' revolution is that there is almost
too much "new language." We are experiencing a form of intellectual
overload from which it will take a decade or more to recover. Law faculty
are neither formally trained as scholars nor experienced in application
of the new methods and subject matters that are reflected in many of the
intellectual experiments. Similarly, there are so many diverse approaches
being used that there is little chance at present that the insights and
methods can be generally shared. For a time, therefore, legal scholars
will have lost the ability to sustain a fully coherent set of standards for
either scholarship or teaching. Languages of political economy, economic
efficiency, "hard cases," legitimation, justice, mystification, feminism,
phenomenology, aesthetics, indeterminacy, literary criticism and decon-
struction, humanism, power, structuralism and post-structuralism and
much more, are, however, not symbols of disintegration, except perhaps
in the narrowest sense. In language that the most conservative adherent
of the Chicago School of Law and Economics would understand, the cur-
rent process is nothing more or less than the cycle of "creative destruction"
described by Joseph Schumpeter.l It reflects an inevitable cycle of cre-
ation and transformation built on the residue and resources of the pre-
existing structure.
While the essence of the traditional system of American legal education
will not be destroyed, the transformation of the law school is well beyond
a simple linear extension of the traditional Langdellian system. The con-
tinuing relationship between legal scholars, the judicial decision and the
work of the legal profession will keep the new languages of discourse
sufficiently enclosed so that the symbiotic connection between legal schol-
ars and just decision-making will be sustained. 82
7 But see, Priest, The New Scientism in Legal Scholarship: A Comment on
Clark and Posner, 90 YALE L.J. 1284 (1981).Allen, supra note 3.
8 J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1950) "The capi-
talist process not only destroys its own institutional framework but it also creates
the conditions for another. Destruction may not be the right word after all. Per-
haps I should have spoken of transformation." Id. at 162.
82 "After all, it is through law, legal institutions, and legal processes that
customs and ideas take on a more permanent, rigid form. The legal system is a
structure. It has shape and form. It lasts. It is visible. It sets up fields of force. It
affects ways of thinking." L. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW 257 (1984).
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V. THE RESENTMENT OF CREATIVITY BY THE
GUARDIANS OF THE PREVAILING ORTHODOXY
The transition between the Langdellian/Realist law school and the
models that will emerge from the schools' new revolutionary period will
not be easy. The conflicts over intellectual direction are already intense
with mainstream doctrinal scholars clashing with Critical Legal Studies
advocates as well as with the more conservative and ideologically moti-
vated members of the Law and Economics movement. The tendency of
any threatened orthodoxy is to repress those responsible for the threat.
This tendency must, however, be resisted if the law schools are to achieve
the levels of quality and intellect at which they have much to offer Amer-
ican society.
Scholarship pursuing relationships between emerging and not yet
understood conditions and needs occurs, not at the accepted center, but
at the borders of disciplines and in the spaces between disciplinary con-
structs. Scholars must be willing to take risks, accept being unsure, not
be afraid to be wrong. "Frontier" and "interstitial" scholarship is needed
now rather than scholarship devoted to the continual retilling of settled
ground. More than ever in their history, American legal scholars need to
explore the outer dimensions of their discipline as well as the core prin-
ciples, to evolve new methods, and to define the methods' potential as
well as their limits. This has never been done in the law schools. Con-
sequently, legal scholarship and the content of law courses have tended
to be far narrower and less intellectually powerful than they ought.
Punishing younger scholars through use of the hiring and tenure proc-
esses in order to keep them out of the system totally, or to keep them
from exploring by using the power of the orthodoxy to subtly define their
scholarship, are extremely shortsighted behaviors for American law
schools. Such behavior chains the explorers. It may preserve the system's
"sense of organic unity" for a brief period, but ultimately erodes it. As
Arthur Brown has suggested, such attitudes can even make a knowledge
system "stupid."8 3 This does not mean that everything done by avant garde
scholars is legitimate. There are boundaries of relevance, utility, resource
priorities, even taste. But, the tendency of any controlling orthodoxy is
always to set the boundaries too close to that with which they are com-
fortable. The tendency of a threatened orthodoxy, such as that of the
American law schools, is even worse.84 The lines are drawn increasingly
tighter, creativity is suppressed.
Orthodoxy is antithetical to creativity. Jacob Bronowski has described
the interweaving of creativity, human reason and imagination in the
following manner.
83 Arthur Brown addresses the idea of institutional systems in his Foreword
to D. KERR, BARRIERS TO INTEGRITY: MODERN MODES OF KNOWLEDGE UTILIZATION
(1984). Brown notes,
Institutions are social systems that shape not only our actions but
our values and dispositions .... [T]o the extent that institutions shape
our values and dispositions they can make us stupid .... and stupidity
deprives us of our humanity. (Emphasis added).
See, Carrington, supra note 8.
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[HIuman reason discovers new relations between things not by
deduction, but by that unpredictable blend of speculation and
insight that scientists call induction, which - like other forms
of imagination - cannot be formalized. 8
The creative insight is the intellectual's ecstatic reward. Rigor, disci-
pline, and thoroughness are vital, but "to create," to have that sudden
pure, clear vision is the poetic essence of those who spend their lives
seeking after truth. Some would even say that the intuitive, creative
insight is how we transcend the limits of conscious reason to see universal
truths. Georg Brandes described the essence of creative spirit more than
half a century ago, emphasizing the need for courage. Contrast Brandes's
description of those possessing the courage to "create new forms" with
Christopher Stone's judgment that, "[ilf I had to offer one broad gener-
alization, I would call it [legal scholarship] overwhelmingly risk averse,
clarity and not-being-wrong dominate imagination. 18 6 Brandes remarked:
He who possesses talent should also possess courage. He must
dare trust his inspiration ... ; he must have gained the har-
dihood to expose himself to the charge of being affected, or on
the wrong path.... [Tihis is the universal formula of a gifted
nature. It countenances neither fugitive rubbish, nor arbitrary
invention, but with entire self-consciousness it expresses the
right of talent when neither traditional form nor existing ma-
terial suffices to meet the peculiar requirements of its nature,
to choose new material, to create new forms .... s7
Very little of the output of academic or scientific knowledge systems is
creative in the courageous, independent sense Brandes described, nor is
it even intended to be creative. Academic and scientific knowledge sys-
tems generally involve processing of existing knowledge for specific in-
terests and with quite limited ends. The ideal of continual striving after
creative breakthroughs is for most academics an ideal to be voiced, but
one rarely risked.
The abilities to critique, interpret and apply existing data within a
given system are, in contrast with the creative drive, clearly bound. They
can all be done with "rigor." It is safer, less controversial and less threat-
ening to established positions to limit research to accepted values and
a J. Bronowski, The Reach of Imagination, in THE NORTON READER 367 (A.
Eastman ed. 1969).
86Stone, supra note 7, at 1153. Remember Felix Cohen's description of Von
Jhering's dream with jurists having "nothing to forget." Cohen, supra note 48.
87 G. BRANDES, CREATIVE SPIRITS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 1 (R. B. An-
derson trans. 1923). The same tension exists in the law. Cole, Agon at Agora:
Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857, 859
(1986) observes:
[I]n landmark cases ... the Justices alter the puzzle itself and create
law. Thus, while judicial legitimacy requires faithful adherence to
precedent, legal development turns on creative acts. As a result, we
call judges who follow precedent legitimate, but those who successfully
break from it great.
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paradigms. Another benefit of limiting the scope and focus of activity is
that the output is tangible and predictable. The traditional or mainstream
scholar or scientist can be more certain that "something useful" (or at
least publishable) will exist when the effort is completed. Few rewards
exist for those who have struggled valiantly yet end up without concrete
products to demonstrate their effort. Academics and scientists quickly
discover that promotions, tenure, salaries and rewards do not go to those
who have tried but failed and therefore could not publish.
Choosing "new material" or seeking to create "new forms" refuses to
offer the same guarantees about having a publishable end product. The
payoffs of efforts to achieve true creativity must, therefore, nearly always
be personal. The drive to do so must nearly always be generated from
within the person. The system will at the very least take a long time to
appreciate the efforts, and is more likely to never do so. There is no
certainty of being right. The early insight may be a dead end, and a
researcher's career may by then have been sidetracked. Much is therefore
being risked by scholars who seek to generate new forms of knowledge,
method and thought. That is why Brandes emphasized the need for cour-
age.
Creativity is not only an individual phenomenon. Creative bursts of
activity by a substantial number of a system's members reflect institu-
tional needs and capabilities more than individual ones. Individual cre-
ative insights occur continually, but they tend to be ignored or
unrecognized because they do not fit the dominant paradigm or they are
not understood as being significant. Involved in a discipline's ability to
comprehend, accept and apply creative insights are questions of timing,
need, capability and critical mass. Creative bursts within a knowledge
system feed on and are driven by (1) high levels of need for breakthroughs,
(2) the cumulative richness of a painstakingly developed but unsynthes-
ized or unrealized data base now readily available at the right time, and
(3) a subtle stream of assertions by pioneer thinkers who laid the foun-
dation but who were premature because the system was not yet ready to
comprehend or adapt to their insights.
Reflecting the cycles described by Koestler and Axelrod, it is important
to understand that academic bureaucracies can be as rigid as govern-
mental ones. Donna Kerr, writing under the aegis of the Academy of
Independent Scholars, concludes in her book, Barriers to Integrity: Modern
Modes of Knowledge Utilization, that "bureaucracy, professionalism, and
the research system have lives of their own. .. " and that "to survive in
the 'system', we ... engage in various forms of lying."
88
One form of lying is self-deception. Within the cycles experienced by
8 D. KERR, supra note 83, at ix. See also R. HUMMEL, THE BUREAUCRATIC
EXPERIENCE (2d ed. 1982). One of the reasons an orthodoxy possesses its power
is suggested by Peter Berger in his INVITATION TO SOCIOLOGY: A HUMANISTIC
PERSPECTIVE (1963). Berger observes that "most of the time we ourselves desire
just that which society expects of us. We want to obey the rules. We want the
parts that society has assigned to us." Id. at 93. Berger also adds that,
"[ilnstitutions carry within them a principle of inertia, perhaps founded ulti-
mately on the hard rock of human stupidity." Id. at 67.
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knowledge systems, even the most creative people eventually become
committed to their own sets of ideas. Commitments develop, an orthodoxy
forms and reputations are established. Even the most creative scholars
tend to develop "hardening of the categories." This hardening dilutes
commitment to the excitement and intensity of the creative and com-
pulsive search for knowledge. 9 Several results occur. We work from a
more closed framework of concepts that no longer drives us toward new
insights. We become less aware of new developments, findings and in-
sights. We actually perceive less because our existing conceptual struc-
ture limits our ability to see new forms not congruent with that existing
structure. We may be aware of the importance of the emerging insights,
but refuse to accept their implications and potentialities. As the originally
creative insight ossifies, the once creative scholars become the enemies
of the next group of creative thinkers, erecting barriers of disciplinary
dogma, process and structure. 90
Academic bureaucracies fight against change because the new knowl-
edge would alter the existing balance of power. It could make the intel-
lectual "Old Guard" less honored and respected. It threatens to relegate
them, at least in their own minds, to the status of historical relics no
longer competent to function in advanced intellectual realms. This is a
problem for even the best of intellectual systems because change is in-
evitable. So, therefore, is tension and conflict. Stress is unavoidable within
rapidly changing systems, such as the American law schools.
The natural resentments created by attacks on a controlling orthodoxy
are multiplied tenfold when it is the integrity of the scholars themselves
that is being assaulted. Some of the attacks by Critical Legal Studies
scholars on mainstream legal scholars have suggested that those tradi-
89 A major example is the Seventeenth Century development of scientific aca-
demies outside the universities. In A. WOLF, A HISTORY OF SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY,
AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE 16TH AND 17TH CENTURIES 54 (2d ed. 1950), the author
describes resistance within the existing universities to being infected by the new
ideas.
The Universities might have been expected to lead, or at least to share,
in this movement for intellectual emancipation. But they did nothing
of the kind. For they were controlled by the Church .... [T]he vast
majority of the pioneers of modem thought were either entirely de-
tached from the Universities, or were but loosely associated with them.
The Common Law possesses its own principles of inertia, R. DAVID, FRENCH
LAW: ITS STRUCTURES, SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY (M. Kindred trans. 1972),
describes the essential nature of the Common Law as viewed from the perspective
of a Civil Law scholar:
English law [common law] was born of procedure, a fact which has
implications not only for the technical form of the law but for legal
philosophy as well .... English law is not an educating or moralizing
law, but an esoteric, technician's law. Whatever is unrelated to liti-
gation, does not concern jurists.
Id. at 76.
9 This seems an obvious point. In support, see the discussion of the university
"power elite" in J. BALDRIDGE, POWER AND CONFLICT IN THE UNIVERSITY 175-77(1971). A recent report of the American Council of Learned Societies was com-
mented upon by Fred Hechinger of the New York Times. According to Hechinger
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tional scholars are little more than apologists for an unjust regime.9' The
bitter resentment of CLS scholars by colleagues who are more traditional
is not surprising when we recognize that part of the CLS analysis is not
only a positive suggestion of new fields of knowledge or new languages
of discourse, but an accusation of illegitimacy directed at traditional schol-
ars themselves.
Repression can be subtle in orthodoxies resting on "soft knowledge."
92
Soft knowledge refers to a system, including law, where knowledge is not
dependent upon or even articulable in strictly empirical, scientific, or
rational terms. 93 The softness and ambiguity emerge from a combination
of the discipline's subject matter and the fact that human choices about
controlling principles and methods tend to be much less precise than in
the realms of "hard knowledge" science. A characteristic of "soft systems"
of knowledge is that there will often be more than one acceptable path
to whatever levels of truth the system is capable of attaining. Equally
significant is that soft truths are often chosen and created by the process
of choice. Among a limited set of alternatives one may be as "true,"
effective, just, or meaningful as another. The choice itself can be the act
that makes the alternative "true." When this occurs in choices of fun-
damental judicial doctrines, hidden values and biases can influence
choices of particular alternatives.
The connection of legal scholarship with courts and judicial doctrine
contributes to the intense reaction to radical criticism by the academic
orthodoxy. A symbiotic relationship has evolved between American law
schools and the judiciary. This relationship integrates legal scholars into
the majority of scholars the Council surveyed in the area of humanities and social
sciences remarked,
that the process (refereed journals) often overlooked pioneering voices
in favor of conservative opinions sanctioned by the academic estab-
lishment or trendy views already approved by powerful intellectual
in-groups.
Hechinger, Scholarly journals called prey of old boy networks, Cleveland Plain
Dealer, Oct. 12, 1986, at 2-G.
91 See Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205
(1982); Michelman, Politics as Medicine: On Misdiagnosing Legal Scholarship,
90 YALE L.J. 1224 (1981); Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship,
90 YALE L.J. 1229 (1981); Kennedy, Cost-Reduction Theory as Legitimation, 90
YALE L.J. 1275 (1981).
92 Consider also Paul Goodman's analysis of how Catholic universities and such
"elite" institutions as Oxford and Cambridge often work to repress new ideas. In
P. GOODMAN, COMPULSORY MIS-EDUCATION AND THE COMMUNITY OF SCHOLARS 195
(1969), Goodman describes the process:
The Dominican genius for putting out the fire of a dangerous idea by
introducing lofty irrelevancies - invented in Paris - is still rampant
in the style of tolerant bigotry of our American Catholic universities
.... Oxford and Cambridge ... have been peculiar masterpieces of
how to imitate the pomp of a paternalistic Establishment and, loaded
with privileges and architecture, to keep one's mouth shut.
Berger supra note 88 at 11, observes: "Very potent and simultaneously very
subtle mechanisms of control are constantly brought to bear upon the actual or
potential deviant. These are the mechanisms of persuasion, ridicule, gossip and
opprobrium."
93 See, E. LEvI, supra note 48.
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a system extending into dimensions distinct from the orientations of pure
knowledge systems. It involves dimensions of action, choice and power.
By being part of the judicial system, legal scholarship is deflected from
what it would be if the relationship did not exist. The judicial system
operates on its own terms and for its own purposes. It is a political sub-
system oriented to problem resolution.94
VI. THE "POLITICAL ECONOMY" OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
There is a "political economy" reflected in the linkages, mutual benefits
and feedback effects that operate between the system of legal scholarship
and the institutions of law. A central aspect of this political economy is
the special bond that exists between the American judiciary and legal
scholars. American legal scholars derive much of their force and effect
from the unique academic-professional structure they inhabit, one not
replicated elsewhere in the world.95 Legal scholars are a different breed
of scholar than most. They are provided with a window of opportunity
providing the chance to "do justice" because of their ability to "speak
truth to power" to those exercising judicial power, and increasingly to
members of the legislative branch as well.
Just as with an economic system, changing one key factor in this re-
lationship alters the other elements of the system. Both Allen and Posner
have been concerned about the harmful effects they perceive the changes
in legal scholarship and the law schools to be producing. Allen has warned
legal scholars not to stray far from the central themes of their system.
The freedom of legal education to devise its scholarly agenda
... is the obverse side of its obligations. The law schools are
professional schools and as such, are obligated to advance the
goals and capacities of the profession. They must have the
freedom to do so in the most effective ways possible.
96
Allen sees a danger that, "[tihe farther law-school scholarship strays
from the law as a source of values and methodology, the more unlikely
it becomes that it will influence the behavior of legal institutions.
'97
See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 54: "[Jludicial
decisions are political decisions, at least in the broad sense that attracts the
doctrine of political responsibility." Id. at 88.
91 See A. CHROUST, 2 THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 197 (1965).
Chroust credits Asahel Stearns's founding of Harvard Law School in 1817 as
creating a uniquely American form of legal education, the "academic professional
school." Compare this with John Dawson's description of the Roman and Canon
law scholars' attitudes toward the common law. See J. DAwSON, THE ORACLES OF
THE LAW 35 (1968).
By severing ties with Roman and Canon law the common law prac-
titioners severed their ties with the universities .... Academic men,
trained in Italianate legal science, would have found it a painful and
fruitless task to fit within their spacious system what no doubt seemed
to them an unorganized mass of meaningless technicalities.
Allen, supra note 3, at 403, 404.
91 Id. at 404.
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Richard Posner, in essence, supports Allen and asserts that "doctrinal
analysis ... is and should remain the core of legal scholarship ...."98
Such remarks demonstrate the recurring tension about the nature and
intellectual functions of the university law school in America.
On one hand we see a university ideal that has been described as the
pursuit of knowledge for its own sake.9 9 The law school is situated within
the university and has the responsibility to serve that institutional mis-
sion. The law school is, however, also committed to the education of grad-
uate students intent on preparing for careers as practicing lawyers. Those
committed to classical educational concepts of the university and to its
traditional scholarly ideal would argue, with some accuracy, that the less
that university legal scholarship and law teaching have to do with the
legal profession and its interests, the better it would be. 00
Yet, the comments of Allen and Posner suggest a close relationship is
justified between the schools and the legal profession, including the ju-
diciary. In fact, what they have done is to accept Morgenthau's definition
of the role of the intellectual, that of "speaking truth to power." Both
Allen and Posner seek to preserve the linkage between the law schools,
the legal profession, and the judiciary so that legal scholars can have
impact upon those who exercise significant power and influence in the
formulation and application of law.
Ironically, Critical Legal Studies, as well as those involved in the Fem-
inist critique of law, can also be understood as being oriented to the same
process of critiquing and confronting power. A basic question arising in
relation to some of the strategies and methods used by these efforts,
however, is whether intellectuals housed within law schools can speak
truth to power effectively if the message is not intelligible or palatable
to the desired listener. This question lies at the foundation of many of
the current disagreements.
The question of the values and orientation of the critique of power is
fundamental. American legal scholarship derives the greatest part of its
practical legitimacy and power, and virtually all its intellectual appro-
bation, from its primary reference communities - the legal profession
and judiciary. American legal scholars should not go too far in assuming
that the existence of the unique institutional structure that supports their
work is decreed by God or is the natural product of widespread admiration
for the profound truths legal scholars utter. The system of legal schol-
98 Posner, supra note 4, at 1113.
9 R. NISBET, supra note 40.
100 See, e.g., T. VEBLEN, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA (1969):
Training for proficiency in some gainful occupation ... has no con-
nection with the higher learning, beyond that juxtaposition given it
by inclusion of vocational schools in the same corporation with the
university ....
The law school belongs in the modern university no more than a school
of fencing or dancing. This is particularly true of the American law
schools ....
Id. at 155.
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arship derives its substantial numbers of scholars, its supportive re-
sources and salaries and the grudging tolerance of university
administrators, directly from the monopoly granted by the organized legal
profession.
The legal profession has granted the system of American law schools
a monopoly entitling them to be the exclusive entry mechanism for the
practice of law.10 ' Absent this monopoly, one suspects, and history sup-
ports the conclusion, that there would be far fewer university law schools
in existence.10 2 The legal profession obviously can and has existed without
university-based law schools. University-based law schools had been and
would, at best, be only pale shadows without the professional monopoly.10 3
It is, therefore, both impolitic and hypocritical to deny the existence of a
substantial obligation to serve the profession's needs for intellectual in-
sight, criticism, information, and training.
This does not mean, however, that American legal scholarship should
not be far-ranging and diverse. It does not mean that legal scholarship
is defined or bounded only by the demands of practicing lawyers or judges.
It also does not mean that the current widespread experimentation in
legal scholarship is actually threatening the relationship between schol-
ars and the judiciary, and between the law schools and the legal profes-
sion. It does mean that legal scholars should recognize the fact of their
relationship with the legal profession and the judiciary, and define and
honor the terms of the monopoly "contract." Even more, legal scholars
need to recognize that the nexus of social forces, morality, political phi-
losophy, emotion, needs for institutional change and stability, social en-
gineering, justice and reason that is played out through the
interpretational lens of the judicial system provides an exciting, and if
properly understood, even an awesome intellectual challenge.
101 See generally R. STEVENS, supra note 9. F. ZEMANS & V. ROSENBLUM, THE
MAKING OF A LEGAL PROFESSION (1981) remark:
With formal legal education maintaining a virtual monopoly over
preparation for entry into the legal profession, it is assumed that law
schools are or ought to be the primary source of the skills and knowl-
edge requisite to the practice of law.
Id. at 123.
'02 See A. CHRouST, supra note 95, at 173-75. The failed experiments attempting
to make law study a part of the general university discipline in America are
related. Id. at 176-90. Charles Warren describes the nature of the colonial lawyer's
education in C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 157-87 (1966).
103 A. CHROUST, supra note 95, at 173-75. An extensive discussion of the form-
ative years of Harvard Law School during the Stearns and Parker period is found
in A. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD 43-91 (1967). Other sources for a history
of the period and of legal education in the United States include: J. AUERBACH,
UNEQUAL JUSTICE (1976); A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
- 1817-1917 (1918); A.Z. REED, supra note 70.
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A. The Function of Doctrinal Analysis
Doctrinal analysis provides the critical mechanism for ensuring that
American legal scholars are fulfilling their obligations, not only to the
judiciary and profession but also to an American society that needs to
know the profession and the judiciary are being challenged to adhere to
strong standards of justice. Doctrinal analysis is American legal schol-
arship's "internal combustion engine." You can tinker with doctrinal anal-
ysis, change the number of principles, increase the power of certain
principles, or improve the efficiency. Options can even be added to make
the doctrine more attractive. However, from the perspective of the system
of legal scholarship, if the engine of judicial doctrine is removed it is no
longer really a complete vehicle, just a shell. As troubling as it might be
to some, Posner and Allen are saying, in effect, that in our haste to
redesign the aerodynamics, internal computers, stereo systems, and cos-
metic elements of legal scholarship, we must not lose sight of the need
to have an engine to power the system.
Stating that doctrine ought to remain the main data focus of American
legal scholarship does not mean that it should be done as it has in the
past. American legal scholarship tends to address legal phenomena as
discrete bits, largely out of contact with the myriad other aspects of the
overall legal system. Legal scholars have tended to deal with doctrine as
if it were self-contained and self-defining. With rare exception, the ar-
ticulation of doctrine has been accepted as a given, with analysis re-
stricted to evaluating the internal consistency of the judicial decision or
the judge's adherence to chains of precedent. Seldom, until quite recently,
did American legal scholars examine doctrines as expressions of deep
strategies or social values. Rarely did concerns of right or wrong, justice,
discrimination, efficiency, distribution, or politics come into the processes
of doctrinal analysis. Hardly ever, other than for a brief period with the
Legal Realists, did legal scholars seek to transcend their own closed "nat-
ural law" logos of neutral principles. 0 4 Never, for all practical purposes,
did legal educators and scholars inquire into critical aspects of the legal
profession, processes of dispute resolution through legal institutions, or
how bundles of judicial doctrines might demonstrate overarching struc-
tures of good and bad action with deeper meaning.
B. Extension of Doctrinal Analysis
Urging a sustained focus on judicial doctrine as a primary source of
raw data, therefore, does not mean that everything remains as it was.
Scholarship that deals only with a single aspect of the specific interests
or needs of compartmentalized legal doctrines or subsystems produces a
104 Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L.
REv. 1 (1959). But cf. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court:
Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169 (1968);
Cohen, The Myth of Neutrality in Positive Legal Theory: Hart Revisited, 31 AM.
J. Juius. 97 (1986).
29Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1989
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
limited piece of knowledge. The knowledge produced tends to be useful
on the levels at which such subsystems function, and, if done with depth
and insight, is well worth doing. Analysis of the doctrines of self-defense
or legal insanity, for example, helps judges, lawyers and other scholars
understand and/or apply a specific, finite element of a particular piece of
the operating subsystem. This is important from a functional perspective,
but is not sufficient in itself. When it is essentially all that is done by
legal scholars, it fails to serve the intellectual mission of the university
law school. This concentration by legal scholars on practical knowledge
that is "of use" or applicational is consistent with the general American
approach to knowledge that Tocqueville identified as a fascination with
knowledge requisite to application rather than wholly structured or deep
metaphysical insights.
0 5
Specialization by knowledge disciplines made inevitable the subdivid-
ing of legal scholarship into increasingly smaller doctrinal units. Rela-
tively little scholarship has been produced by American legal scholars
that seeks to view the legal system in its totality.06 Roscoe Pound and
Karl Llewellyn are perhaps the most visible exceptions to the traditional
approaches by legal scholars. Unger, Posner, Dworkin, Finnis, and Law-
rence Friedman are striking examples of how modern legal scholarship
has begun to extend the scope and scale of inquiry. These scholars have
attempted to offer significant syntheses of legal thought, rather than be
content with limited, and limiting, analyses of discrete doctrines. Gen-
erally, however, American legal scholars have been content to work
within the limits of particular doctrines, expanding that focus only
through collections of doctrines in the form of law casebooks.
This traditional orientation is only partly due to Christopher Langdell's
elevation of the judicial decision as the exclusive data of American legal
science. 0 7 It is also a function of the orientation ofjudges and lawyers to
105 de Tocqueville observed that:
In America the purely practical part of science is admirably under-
stood, and careful attention is paid to the theoretical portion which
is immediately requisite to application. On this head the Americans
always display a clear, free, original and inventive power of mind.
But hardly anyone in the United States devotes himself to the essen-
tially theoretical and abstract portion of human knowledge. In this
respect the Americans carry to excess a tendency which is, I think,
discernible, though in a less degree, among all democratic nations.
2 ALEXIS DE TOcQUEVILLE, DEMOcRACY IN AMERICA 43 (H. Reeve trans. 1899).
106 In his MEDITATIONS at 202 (C. Eliot, ed. Harvard Classics ed. 1909), Marcus
Aurelius described the need to try to understand in holistic terms, when he wrote:
"This then must always bear in mind, what is the nature of the whole, and what
is my nature, and how this is related to that, and what kind of a part it is of
what kind of a whole."
Hans Kelsen has stated the vision in terms relevant to legal scholars: "The
cognition of Law, like any cognition, seeks to understand its subject as a mean-
ingful whole." Quoted in C. MURPHY, JR., MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: THE TEN-
SION BETWEEN EXPERIENTIAL AND ABSTRACT THOUGHT (1978).
107 J.B. CONANT, supra note 36, spends some time analyzing the connection
between Langdell, legal science and science. Conant quotes the following passage
from C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1871):
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directly applicable knowledge. As legal scholarship extends to less di-
rectly applicable forms of intellectual inquiry, the degree to which the
legal scholar's product has utility or meaning becomes less clear to those
who are informed by scholars' arguments. While this apparent gap will
often not be a real one, if perceived as real by those toward whom the
scholarly insights are directed, the apparent gap can have the same neg-
ative impact on the acceptability of legal scholarship. The scholarship
will be ignored, rejected, or even generate a counter-reaction as has CLS.
VII. PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE INTELLECTUAL REVOLUTION
Many of the recent events within the law schools have been far more
political than intellectual. The revolution in the law schools is not pri-
marily one of detached, "ivory tower" intellect. The revolutionaries have
specific agendas that are action driven rather than consistent with a
contemplative ideal of knowledge. Eric Hoffer once commented on the
roles of "fault-finding men of ideas," understanding that they created
uncertainty and prepared the way for change. Lenin also recognized that
the arguments of intellectuals play important roles in undermining a
challenged system. Intellectuals to Lenin were a weapon against the
dominant political system, one useful for cracking the orthodoxy's foun-
dations and casting doubt on its legitimacy. When intellectual arguments
are used in this way, truth becomes subservient, even irrelevant, to the
strategic need to marshal arguments that weaken the opponent. Intellect,
therefore, becomes a powerful tool serving political ends, a tool made even
more powerful by the careful pretense that the arguments are in fact
true.
This use of intellect reflects a political strategy, not only by attacking
scholars such as those in Critical Legal Studies, but also by ones already
in power as a means to legitimize their control. When used in this way
the arguments are propaganda, distorted definitions of reality chosen to
achieve desired ends regardless of truth. 10 8 Too often now there is less
truly intellectual debate in the law schools than exchanges of propaganda
designed to attack or defend positions. Three of the major strands of
scholarship that have emerged in the law schools over the past ten years,
Law and Economics, Critical Legal Studies, and the conflict over Con-
stitutional interpretation, are predominantly propagandistic.
For the university, use of intellect as a weapon independent of a com-
mitment to truth violates the spirit of the institution's fundamental ideal.
Yet, the lines between such uses of intellect, and its use in service of an
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines.
To have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with
constant facility to the ever-tangled skein and hence to acquire that
mastery should be the business of every earnest student of the law.
Id. at 44.
The scientific mastery of the law was to be acquired through the systematic
study of the growth of the law "through a series of cases." Id. at 47.
1J8 J. ELLUL, PROPAGANDA (1965).
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advocated position believed to be both just and true, are often extraor-
dinarily difficult to see clearly. Scholars seeking to challenge what seems
to them to be the unjust actions of a corrupt aspect of the legal system
also risk succumbing to a Machiavellian "ends justifying the means"
system of values.
Both Law and Economics (Chicago) and Critical Legal Studies are po-
litical movements that are based upon and emerge from coherent schools
of political thought and preference. This does not mean that nuggets of
truth and insight are not contained within the scholarship. Propaganda
is even more effective when elements of truth are contained within the
arguments.0 9 A substantial part of the scholarship produced by adherents
to these movements is shaped to serve the political beliefs and goals of
the particular school.
Much of what has been written by Critical Legal Studies scholars
emerges, for example, from a deliberate political strategy aimed at un-
dermining the foundations of the existing system of legal thought, value,
assumption and action. The fact that CLS may not be up to the task it
has chosen does not change the mission. 0 9 The thinking of some CLS
scholars is most likely that, since they consider there to be no truth in
the existing system, facilitating its disintegration is appropriate. In fact,
the intent of the deconstructive method is to reduce an existing analytic/
political system to chaos so that a true system can emerge from the
rubble."' Viewed in this light, it can be understood why CLS scholars
consider strategies of demystification, delegitimation and deconstruction
ofjudicial and legislative institutions to be necessary before there can be
any chance of positive or constructive truth. The argument is that real
truth cannot exist until the distorting foundations of the existing, corrupt
system have been destroyed. We would then supposedly be able to see
more clearly once that false system is dismembered. A true system could
then be constructed without the biases, prejudices, masks and class-pre-
serving injustices assumed to be inherent aspects of the existing legal
system.
The Chicago School of Law and Economics represents a much more
focused political strategy than Critical Legal Studies. Both the Chica-
goans and CLS have targeted the Liberal political tradition, particularly
the institutions of law. CLS has sought to crumble the foundations of
Liberalism while the Chicagoans have striven to deflect Liberalism from
the Welfare State. Concentrating on values and doctrines used by judges,
the Chicagoans have been seeking to re-engineer the legal system, to
1
0 9 Id.
110 See Louis Menand's biting critique of the extreme gap between Critical Legal
Studies' professed goals, its capabilities, and behaviors in Menand, supra note 6.
"I See generally G. ROSE, supra note 28. Rose critically examines the post-
structuralist work of Deleuze, Derrida, and Foucault remarking that the delib-
erate "destruction of knowledge" they seek "is justified by its perpetrators as the
only way to escape the utopian projections and historicist assumptions of dialectic;
'eternal repetition of the same' is said to be a harder truth than the false and
dialectical promise of reconciliation."
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reflect what they consider to be the values and preferences of the majority
of Americans, rather than what they consider an intellectually dominant
minority, known as "Liberals."
CLS scholars, on the other hand, have only begun to try to work out
the nature of the system that might emerge if they were successful in
undermining the foundations of the Liberal Rule of Law. The Chicagoans,
conversely, have a very clear picture of what they want to achieve. The
Chicagoans' vision is seen in the works of Irving Kristol, Richard Posner,
Milton Friedman and George Gilder. Posner is the only Law and Eco-
nomics member, but the others are leaders in the Neoconservative move-
ment from which the Chicagoans' strategy emerged. In this
Neoconservative world, women are better off at home or receiving lower
pay if they must work; affirmative action to correct past wrongs is highly
undesirable; government is nearly always a less preferable actor than
individuals; and the "magic of the Market" is to be worshipped. In the
Neoconservative vision, God was the First Capitalist.
112
The valid insights offered by both Law and Economics and Critical
Legal Studies, therefore, need to be carefully extracted from the massive
baggage of their political rhetoric. Each movement has unquestionably
brought vitally needed insights to the law schools. Among the most im-
portant contributions of Critical Legal Studies have been, (1) bringing
new tools of textual and linguistic analysis to bear on the formulation
and application of judicial doctrine, (2) deconstructive methods, (3) rec-
ognition of the limits and distortions of rationalism as well as formal
philosophic method, (4) continuing in the Existentialist tradition of work-
ing through literature to bridge analytic and methodological gaps, and
to seek to make philosophy something that can be done and shared by
intelligent, thoughtful people rather than only by a specialized philo-
sophical profession removed from human reality, (5) bringing important
Marxist concepts to American legal thought, including language of de-
mystification and legitimation as well as the effects of economic and class
structures on the content and uses of law, and (6) enhancing our steadily
growing recognition that law is political behavior.
The Chicago School has also brought important insights to the law
schools. While not as abundant or diverse as those of CLS, they have
been powerful and useful. Justice Holmes asserted nearly a century ago
that to understand the law legal scholars must understand the principles
of political economy." 3 Until very recently legal scholars failed to follow
Holmes' urging, tending to rely instead on the internal content ofjudicial
doctrines. Economic theory and analysis is, however, a dominant and
inescapable reality of the modern world. Economic analysis and political
economy are becoming even more important elements of intellectual
strategies as economic decisions and policy infuse every level of political
112 See G. GILDER, WEALTHAND POVERTY, pt. III, "The Economy of Faith" (1981).
"' Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1899). "[I]t seems to
me that every lawyer ought to seek an understanding of economics. The present
divorce between the schools of political economy and law seems to me in evidence
of how much progress in philosophical study remains to be made."
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decision-making in an increasingly resource conscious world. Fernand
Braudel, for example, recently described economics as a "remarkable
science", concluding:
So great has been its contribution to theory that it offers a
system of rules that can be easily manipulated. When you begin
to grasp the idea of deep economic structures, you become aware
of those elements of history that change slowly but that bear
significantly on the world economy. Economics not only shapes
people; it also manipulates them. It functions in an uncon-
scious, almost Freudian way. It sheds light on everything. It
occupies every level of activity.' 14
Economic theory, tools of economic analysis and the languages of po-
litical economy are inescapably languages of power. They are, therefore,
languages of the law as well which is the formalization, institutionali-
zation, and allocation of power within society. Understanding these lan-
guages and their underlying assumptions, abuses, and limits, is no longer
something that legal scholars can or should avoid. Prominent British
economist Joan Robinson has, for example, warned that economics must
be understood "to avoid being deceived by economists." 1 15 Regrettably,
this warning is well-heeded in examining the work of both the Chicagoans
and Critical Legal Studies.
Whatever the deficiencies, distortions, and abuses of Law and Econom-
ics, there have been significant contributions. These include, (1) a new
language of efficiency, economic values, and effects, (2) a conscious ex-
tension of law and legal scholarship into realms of economic policy, (3) a
greater clarification of the Conservative/Liberal debate, (4) a sense of the
legitimacy of extending legal scholarship into related fields, and (5) that
legal scholarship could not be contained within the often circular internal
content of judicial decisions.
If both Critical Legal Studies and the Chicago School have demon-
strated that law and legal scholarship must transcend narrow doctrinal
boundaries in search of ideas, solutions, insights and methods, neither
has demonstrated the limits of the quest. This is the dilemma of modern
legal scholarship and it is one that is both practical and intellectual. The
world of law is enormous in scope, diverse in content, and myriad in its
complexity. Yet, law is itself rendered small by the overall universe of
knowledge. 116 Until the end of the Eighteenth Century it was thought
possible to master the whole of human knowledge. The university was
organized to teach the scope of our knowledge..However, modern science
rendered this universalist orientation impossible, with nothing but the
liberal arts orientation left to reflect the assumptions of mastery. 117
114 Braudel, The 'New History': Musings on an 'interscientific' quest for truth,
32 WORLD PRESS REV., 30-32 (1985).Il Joan Robinson, in R. KUTrNER, THE ECONOMIC ILLUSION (1984). See also G.
AKERLOF, AN ECONOMIC THEORIST'S BOOK OF TALES (1984); A. ATKINSON, THE
ECONOMICS OF INEQUALITY (2d ed. 1983); ECONOMICS IN DIssARRAY (P. Wiles & G.
Rough eds. 1984); C. WILBER & K. JAMIESON, AN INQUIRY INTO THE POVERTY OF
ECONOMICS (1983).
116 See J. MARTIN, supra note 43.
7 J. ELLUL, supra note 43.
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Because the enormous mass, diversity, and range of potentially avail-
able knowledge will otherwise render nearly any discipline meaningless,
rigid boundaries and definitions now control the conditions studied by a
discipline. Standards, comparability, quality, coherence, and utility will
be impossible to maintain absent legitimate, limiting, and intelligible
disciplinary paradigms. But, how are the limits set, how do they change,
who establishes them, and are there disciplines for which such limits are
counterproductive?
Answering these questions for the discipline of law involves defining
the university law school in America, including its educational, profes-
sional, and intellectual missions. Such definitional analysis I have at-
tempted to do elsewhere, but several comments are appropriate."8 First
of all, Christopher Langdell, in taking the raw data of appellate judicial
decisions as the focus of law schools and ultimately legal scholarship, and
claiming that these decisions contained the law, permanently altered the
nature of American law schools and legal scholarship. From this choice
emerged the linkage of law schools, legal profession, and judiciary that
remains to this day.
Langdell was hired by Charles Eliot, Harvard's new president, because
twenty years earlier, when he was a student at Harvard, Eliot had been
extraordinarily impressed by, Langdell's approach to legal study. When
Eliot later recruited Langdell, Harvard's Law School was in serious trou-
ble with declining enrollments and widespread dissatisfaction with its
quality. 119 If Eliot had not met Langdell two decades earlier, he might
have succumbed to the view that education of lawyers did not belong in
the university. 120 Eliot might have closed Harvard's Law School, just as
it had been shut down in 1829 when enrollment fell to one student. 121 In
closing Harvard Law School, Eliot might logically then have instructed
the departments of philosophy and political economy to deal with what-
ever they considered important and legitimate about law. If this hypo-
thetical set of events had occurred, there could have been a decoupling
of the universities and the legal education of people eager to become
practicing lawyers. If so, both legal education and university scholarship
about law would have evolved in very different patterns.
If academic scholarship examining law were freed of the influences,
methods, commitments, values, and interests of career-minded students
intent first and foremost on becoming lawyers, of practicing lawyers; of
judges, and of peers oriented to professional/academic/doctrinal legal
scholarship, then the kinds of research being done would unquestionably
be very different from that- of Langdellian law scholars and teachers.
Perhaps it would have taken on a more Continental gloss, or developed
a coherent social science of law. This does not mean that the "more in-
"8 Prophets, supra note 10; University Ideal, supra note 10.
'19 See A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARvARD LAW SCHOOL; 1817-1917, supra
note 103, at 14-16, 21-23; McCaughey, The Transformation of American Academic
Life: Harvard University 1821-1892, in 8 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY,
supra note 33, at 239, 263.
120 T. VEBLEN, supra note 100.
121 A. CHROUST, supra note 95, at 197-98.
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tellectual" or scientific scholarship of law would be better. The point is
simply that it would be a distinct variety or varieties of scholarship, with
different methods, data, hypotheses, and missions.
In any event, Langdell did become Dean of Harvard Law School. Lang-
dell and Ames molded a system from which it would be impossible to
extricate legal scholarship and law teaching. By focusing on collections
of appellate judicial decisions, doctrinal analysis, and educating aspiring
lawyers, the Langdellian paradigm that later joined with the American
Bar Association (ABA) and Legal Realism has foreclosed forms of intel-
lectual inquiry that would have developed if the law had instead been
placed in university departments of philosophy, political economy, polit-
ical science, social science, or even in a university department of law not
oriented to educating students intent on becoming practicing lawyers.
If the Langdellian model had not preempted the field of inquiry into
law, as well as defined law as judicial doctrine, many of the methods now
being brought to bear upon law would have emerged long before they
entered the consciousness of American law faculty. This would likely
include economic analysis, literary criticism, analysis ofjustice, morality,
political economy, Feminist critique, Marxist analysis based on consid-
erations of class and economic structure and so forth. The Langdellian/
ABA paradigm is, however, dominated by its orientation to the profession
and the judiciary. There is some room within it for what could be called
pure scholarship, or knowledge sought for its own sake, but the space
allocated for such activities is relatively small. When the amount of schol-
arship that does not directly serve the needs of the Langdellian/ABA
paradigm increases beyond a given level of tolerance, the system reacts
against what to it seems first an irritant and then a cancer.
The system's resistance to pure intellectual activity is significant. This
is because lawyers, judges, law students, and most law professors are not
intellectuals, but people who use intellect primarily to achieve specific
ends. 122 The vision of the pure scholar has little relevance for such people
because they are pragmatists who are responsible for taking effective
action and resolving problems. In their active, problem solving mode,
they have little interest in abstract propositions. They need active, con-
crete, effective applications of knowledge. The inhabitants of the Lang-
dellian/ABA paradigm, consequently, have scant use for much of the
scholarly work being generated by Critical Legal Studies, Law and Lit-
erature, or Law and Economics scholars. This in no way means the work
of these groups is not logically relevant to the activities ofjudges, lawyers,
and traditional legal academics. It does mean that the key factor is not
logical relevance but proximity and utility defined by the project or task
of judges and traditional scholars, not by more abstracted relevance.
The new legal scholars, on the other hand, have little patience with
those they consider to be sources of prejudice, analytically unsound, or
122 See, e.g., R. HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE 26 (1970)
"[Flew of us believe that a member of a profession, even a learned profession, is
necessarily an intellectual .... [I]ntellect may help but intelligence will serve
well enough. We know ... that all academic men are not intellectuals ...."
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anti-intellectual. Many of the new scholars are intent on advancing the
messages of their particular schools of thought, advocating their partic-
ular version of truth, or creating their vision of what university schol-
arship in law would be if the Langdellian/ABA paradigm had never been
constructed.
These competing attitudes, abstracted relevance and direct application,
produce an irresolvable tension. At the boundaries of the traditional par-
adigm and the more extreme aspects of the new legal scholarship, the
tension is not even productively dialectical because the interests are so
profoundly and unalterably dissimilar. Common ground can be identified,
however, once we move past the extremes. This common ground is where
the real revolution in legal thought is occurring. The real intellectual
revolution in American law schools increasingly recognizes the productive
interface between legal scholars, teaching, law students, lawyers, judges,
and legislators, as well as scholars in other disciplines. During the second
decade of the intellectual revolution, there will be some consolidation and
refinement of the diverse thinking that has been done. Law and Economics
will soften its ideology and become understood more as "economic methods
and political economy." CLS is already becoming less strident and has
much to offer in terms of "methods of identifying the political content
and biases of law and judicial decisions." Constitutional interpretation
might be better seen as "the necessity and role of authority in preserving
the legitimacy of law and legal institutions."
VIII. CONCLUSION
A. Visions of Justice
The second stage of the law schools' revolution is beginning. The basic
principles involved in the revolution's second stage include, (1) recogni-
tion of the vital importance of the metaprinciple of justice as the critical
component in the emerging paradigm; 123 (2) development of respect among
law faculty for law students, for lawyers, and for the judiciary, including
the recognition that it is largely through these mechanisms that justice
is realized; (3) insistence that these groups themselves recognize, under-
stand, accept, and adhere to principles and behaviors consistent with
principles of justice; (4) development of clear understanding of emerging
social needs and the roles law can play in achieving equitable solutions;
and (5) orientation of research and teaching toward development and
attainment ofjust and equitable solutions to critical social problems, ones
amenable to being addressed in some meaningful degree by law and legal
institutions.
' W. GALSTON, JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN GOOD 1 (1980): "Unlike many prob-
lems debated heatedly but fleetingly, justice is both theoretically meaningful and
practically important."
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Much of modern legal scholarship derives either from a positive con-
ception of justice or emerges as a particularized reaction to conditions
perceived as unjust. The Chicago School, for example, can be understood
both in terms of its ideal vision ofjustice, and the substantial distributive
injustices its vision arguably imposes upon disadvantaged groups. Critical
Legal Studies, as well as the Feminist critique, emerge from ideas of
justice, albeit ones that are often phrased more negatively as critiques
of the injustices of the existing system. CLS, for example, assumes that
the existing capitalistic system is unjust and that law and legal insti-
tutions help preserve its ability to be unjust. Similarly, the debate over
the techniques to be used to interpret the Constitution is not really about
techniques. Arguments about techniques of interpretation are simply the
point at which a political dispute that is grounded on specific visions of
a just (or at least preferable) society has been joined. To some extent it
is an intellectual non-debate. The fact that it has gone on as long as it
has reflects the deep political nature of the real conflict.
The negative analytic techniques are approaching the end of their use-
fulness, at least for a time. The main political messages have been de-
livered. We know by now that the law is not value-free or comprised of
neutral principles. We know that women and racial minorities have been
discriminated against. We know that judicial decisions reflect judicial
experiences and human value systems, ones that can be as right or wrong
as those of any other humans. We know that law is a political system,
and that judges are political actors. We know that new methods are needed
to enrich legal thought. We know that economic analysis can be a powerful
tool for legal scholars.
The new languages of discourse that have been injected into the law
from outside its academic boundaries have rapidly entered the awareness
of many legal scholars. They are now in the process of being re-interpreted
into the more traditional frameworks. The more radical aspects of the
critiques of either the Right or the Left have passed their points of sig-
nificant usefulness, politically and intellectually. Unless they are able to
generate richer, more just, constructive contributions, the radical posi-
tions will become tiresome. Fortunately, a richer dialogue does seem to
be emerging. Some Law and Economics work is developing apart from
the political mission of the Chicago School.12 4 Critical Legal Studies schol-
ars such as Tushnet and Unger are making important and thoughtful
contributions. 125 The conflict over the legitimate processes of Constitu-
tional interpretation overlaps CLS, the Neoconservatives, and other un-
affiliated legal scholars who are aware of the importance of the debate
over the limits of judicial power.
124 An example is the work of Goetz and Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice:
An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 261 (1985).
125 See, e.g., Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, supra note 91;
Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in Deconstruc-
tion, supra note 6; see generally R. UNGER, supra note 67.
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B. How Does This Relate to Students, Lawyers, and Judges?
What do the current controversies have to do with law, lawyers, law
students, judges, or virtually any other relevant interest group in Amer-
ican society? The answer is, to this point, very little. The works of the
new legal scholars have had scarcely any impact upon, are not understood
or even read by those primary interest groups. Hardly any one other than
the already converted reads the products of American legal scholars,
particularly those being produced by the leading intellectual movements
of the decade. This, of course, does not mean that the work of those scholars
is intellectually illegitimate or that it will not ultimately have substantial
effect on the scholars themselves and on lawyers, students, and judges.
Immediate acceptance of one's work may even be a sign that it is already
dated. It may take considerable time before new ideas and findings are
able to infiltrate and penetrate the protective covering of a dominant
paradigm. Existing orthodoxies fight hard to maintain the integrity of
the system that has been painstakingly constructed, recognizing that
change can cause an unraveling. This leads to recognition that the mere
fact that a scholar's analysis is not quickly adopted by other scholars or
key reference groups says little about the merit of the scholarship, either
good or bad.
With few exceptions, however, the scholars who have recently produced
the truly seminal work that has changed our perceptions are not even
American legal scholars. Richard Posner is an exception, but Roberto
Unger, John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and John Finnis were either trained
in a different system (Unger, Finnis), are not legally trained at all (Rawls)
or, even though educated in the American system, grew to maturity in
the traditions of Oxford (Dworkin). The texture of the works of scholars
like Rawls, Finnis, Dworkin, and Unger is of a different kind than the
work of scholars writing within American law schools. The depth, scale,
breadth, and nuance of the works of those seminal scholars is on another
level. Critical to understanding the significance of each, however, is rec-
ognition that these scholars, including the oft-maligned Posner, have had
significant impact because they have sought to synthesize and construct,
and were not simply content to analyze and deconstruct. This reveals one
of the deficiencies generated by the too extreme and self-contained con-
centration on analysis of legal doctrine as taught in the processes of
American legal education. It also puts scholars such as Roscoe Pound,
Lon Fuller, and Karl Llewellyn in a special light, and perhaps also the
treatise writers and restatement editors who, whatever their faults, were
nonetheless attempting to either create or describe a significant and co-
herent subsystem of law. Compare that to the past twenty years of Amer-
ican legal scholarship, the basic theme of which seems to be "attack and
dismember."
The American system has been producing scholars highly skilled at
dismembering others' work but who cannot "see the forest for the trees"
and have little sense of the "ecology" of law. While American legal schol-
ars should be appreciated for their analytic and deconstructive brilliance,
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their scholarship has been producing an absence of something rather than
an extension of the substance of our intellectual awareness. To the extent
that legal scholarship has been unaware of the abuses of law in both its
macro and micro senses, scholarship that challenged the abuses is wholly
legitimate. Those who are highly skilled in analytic dismemberment will
always be respected for their intellectual acuity and acerbity. But, such
scholars offer the intellectual equivalent of "one-liners," uttering amusing
or shocking analyses that quickly flit out of existence. Such strategies
are necessary and will always be a useful tool for disturbing a complacent
power structure. At some point, however, the cycle of knowledge systems
needs to harvest the best insights from the challengers and the traditional
perspectives and synthesize or construct new conceptions. Even Marx,
perhaps particularly Marx, is remembered for what he attempted to con-
struct in Capital rather than his many earlier insightful critiques of the
abuses of industrial society.
12 6
There are strands of constructive intellectual activity now emerging
in the law schools. These include a rebirth ofjurisprudence, with the idea
of Natural Law providing important concepts for understanding the roles
and limits of law in political communities. Whether dealt with in formal
courses on jurisprudence or contained within other courses, justice-ori-
ented themes are being raised in many contexts. No longer is there an
assumption of value-neutrality either in the application or the structure
of law. In the same way, courses on professional responsibility, ethics,
and the roles of the lawyer and the legal profession are introducing con-
cepts of justice and responsibility.
Nor is the revolution in the law schools limited to abstractions. Clinical
legal education began as an exercise in social justice. 27 Whether defined
as professional responsibility, technique, or role, clinical education was
based on assumptions of the social and political responsibility of the
lawyer. Clinical education contained an implicit political vision and it
was no accident that many of the main figures in the earlier period of
the clinical movement had backgrounds in civil rights and legal services
for the poor.128 Until the latter half of the 1970s, the clinical movement
sought to advance a powerful conception of social responsibility for law-
yers. It then underwent a transformation into method and professional
technique, a change which essentially marked the end of the clinical
126K. MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1906).
127 See, Pincus, supra note 19, at 295 (1971);
[T]here are certain areas where the intervention of law schools
through clinical work is an indispensable element for improving the
administration ofjustice. For the foreseeable future law students and
law faculty are the only ones who can do something which holds
promise, day in and day out, of upgrading the machinery of justice.
128 See, Barnhizer, "The Intellectual Contributions of Clinical Faculty: Facil-
itating Fundamental Change in the American Law Schools Through Aggressive
Formulations of Models of Justice and Humanity (Sept. 1989) (unpublished paper
prepared for the 1989 UCLA Warwick conference on clinical legal education and
scholarship).
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movement, as a movement, and signalled the birth of the legal skills
movement.129
Very closely related to the justice-oriented phase of the clinical move-
ment was the Humanistic Legal Studies movement founded by Jack Him-
melstein. 130 Like its clinical counterpart, legal humanism contained a
vision of how the enlightened lawyer ought to behave. Many of the people
involved in clinical education were also participants in the humanistic
movement, although there was significant involvement by other law fac-
ulty.
Both the clinical and humanistic movements generated widespread
impacts outside their own borders. These "ripple effects" may have been
the primary triumphs of each movement, just as the unanticipated effects
are likely to be the most important consequences of Law and Economics
and Critical Legal Studies. Both clinical education and legal humanism
generated scholarship and course content that focused on the roles of
lawyers, the responsibility to do justice, and critiques of the legal profes-
sion and courts, including the trial courts. These were areas that had
been almost totally ignored in the development of legal thought, both in
American law schools and elsewhere. Similarly, there was very little
written prior to 1970 concerning the nature of the human dimension of
being a lawyer. The same was true about the skills of law practice. Trial
advocacy texts written in the 1960s or 1970s, with the exception of Robert
Keeton's classic work, seem crude in comparison with the quality of those
now in existence. The quality, scope, and abundance of writings on the
concerns of courts, on legal techniques, and on subject matters such as
negotiation, advocacy, interviewing, counseling, pleading, drafting, dam-
ages, mediation, arbitration, and so forth have grown so greatly over only
a decade that the change is amazing to those who have been around since
the beginning of the transformation.
Without a sense of recent history, it is easy to miss the scale of the
changes within the law schools. Members of the practicing bar and ju-
diciary can easily fail to understand the nature of the law schools of 1990
because they can mistakenly think that their law schools of ten, twenty,
or thirty years ago accurately represent the nature of current legal ed-
ucation. Many of the current debates about law schools seem blind to the
revolution the schools have experienced in content, structure, method,
demographics, scholarship, and mission. Since, however, the changes are
not even well understood by the faculty of the law schools, it is not
surprising that others lack accurate perceptions.
The scale of the changes makes it difficult to understand the widespread
belief among leaders of the legal profession that the law schools are
refusing to adapt to the needs of the legal profession.' 3' There has of
12 See Barnhizer, Clinical Education at the Crossroads: The Need for Direction,
1977 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1025 (1977).
13o Himmelstein, supra note 17.
131 See, e.g., McCrate, Paradigm Lost - Or Revised and Regained?, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 295 (1988); Edwards, The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the Profession,
38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 285 (1988).
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course not been complete adaptation, nor should there be. The law schools
are not servants of the interests of either the profession or the judiciary,
but are creatures of the university and society.
C. An Example of Reforms in the Content of Legal Education
The majority of this Article has considered some of the changes that
have come about in the focus of legal scholarship. Of equal importance
are the shifts in curriculum and content that the schools have experienced.
In some ways the shifts mirror changes in academic focus but curricular
change has by and large altered much of what is actually done in the law
schools while seeming, on the surface, to remain largely the same. The
curriculum of the Cleveland State University College of Law provides an
example of how law schools have responded innovatively to an expanded
sense of professional responsibility.
In addition to the traditional core curriculum of the first year, the
College of Law offers first year students a course in "Legal Writing,
Research, and Advocacy." A recently added requirement is that first year
students select from a menu of approximately fifteen "perspectives"
courses designed to provide context beyond that gained in core courses.
Each first year law student is required to select a "perspective elective"
from a list that includes Jurisprudence, American Legal History, Com-
parative Law, "When Justice Fails," Law and Society, English Legal Sys-
tem, International Law, Legislation, Law and Economics; and Law,
History, and Economics.
Clinical law programs and judicial externships are offered in addition
to several courses in professional responsibility and the legal profession.
An extensive advocacy curriculum has been developed. It includes a con-
centrated "full-immersion" two week course in trial advocacy, various one
semester courses in trial advocacy, as well as specialized courses such as
Motion Practice, Psychology of the Courtroom, and Advanced Litigation.
The advocacy curriculum includes Trial Evidence, a course that combines
a traditional evidence course with a trial advocacy program. Along with
these courses are ones in Alternative Dispute Resolution, Appellate Prac-
tice, Class Actions, Complex Litigation, Section 1983 Litigation, Discov-
ery Practice; Interviewing, Counseling and Negotiation; Lawyers' Strat-
egies, Remedies, and Pre-Trial Practice. The Pre-Trial Practice; course
is an intensive, semester long program that has virtually all the char-
acteristics of a clinical program except that it uses specifically developed
simulated cases as the experience base for the law students.
In addition to these programs, the College of Law has established a
joint program in Law, Politics, and Policy with Cleveland State Univer-
sity's College of Urban Affairs. This program combines clinical experi-
ences with courses on legislation, urban problems, research, and
strategies. The College of Law was also one of the first institutions in the
United States to establish a Street Law program in which law students
teach law in area high schools. From the Street Law program emerged
a partnership between the College of Law and the Cleveland Public
[Vol. 37:2
42https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol37/iss2/4
1989] THE REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS 269
Schools to create and manage a Law and Public Service Magnet High
School to provide a national model for educating disadvantaged urban
youth.
The College of Law's programs suggest how far American law schools
have traveled in their efforts to meet their extensive responsibilities to
society, to law students, and to the legal profession. Such efforts simply
did not exist even a very few years ago and are transforming and reflecting
the mission, content, and nature of the revolution that is going on in
American law schools. The depth and scope of the schools' efforts have
expanded greatly. Focused educational efforts directed toward legal skills,
lawyer ethics, student analytical capabilities, and expanded philosophical
awareness have burgeoned in an amazingly short period of time. In part
this reflects the equivalent trends in academic research but there is also
a significant pedagogical and curricular revolution proceeding largely
independent of the scholarly dimension. The various movements that
have already been described can take credit for much of the experimen-
tation, but faculty who came into the law schools in clinical roles and/or
participated in the humanistic movement have played particularly im-
portant roles in what has happened in changing law school teaching and
course content. The diversity and intensity of the revolution has been
extended as well by legal philosophers, feminists, economic theorists,
practicing lawyers, and by Critical Legal Studies scholars. Their contri-
butions have not only been through their own scholarship but are direct
consequences of the pressure their challenges generated, forcing more
traditional law faculty to respond to their critiques.
The scale and rapidity of the changes is startling. The changes are
fundamental, but unfinished. A different kind of institution is ultimately
evolving although, like the common law, it will tend to look much the
same to the external observer. Many within the law schools are trying
to solve the new equations that will determine the future shape of Amer-
ican law schools. The legal profession and judiciary must participate in
the debate, but must also recognize their own biases and that the law
schools are creatures of society, not servants of the narrower interests of
lawyers, students, or judges, or for that matter, of self-interested academ-
ics. The profession and judiciary have not yet caught up with the new
reality of the American law school. Neither, however, have many law
faculty.
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